Are revenues from energy leases reinvested by U.S. farms? Evidence from TOTAL by Grout, Travis
ARE REVENUES FROM ENERGY LEASES
REINVESTED BY U.S. FARMS?
EVIDENCE FROM TOTAL
A thesis
presented to the faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
by
Travis Austin Grout
August 2018
c© 2018 Travis Austin Grout
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ABSTRACT
Farmland prices and agricultural production costs rose significantly over the last two
decades, putting increasing pressure on farm operators and agricultural landowners to gen-
erate more revenue per acre. At the same time, millions of acres of U.S. agricultural land
became attractive for energy development due to the shale gas revolution and rising de-
mand for utility-scale solar and wind power. To its supporters, energy development on
agricultural land is a win-win proposition, offering land-rich but cash-poor farm owners a
new stream of income and, potentially, the means to relieve credit constraints and reinvest
in their farms. Critics, however, fret that turning productive farmland over to gas wells
and solar panels will contribute to long-term loss of agricultural land and raise the costs of
farming in areas attractive for energy development.
At the crux of this debate are two still-unanswered or partially answered empirical
questions: (1) what are the characteristics of farm businesses that choose to participate in
energy leases and (2) what is the impact of energy leases on the long-term viability of host
farms? This study uses national survey data from the USDA’s 2014 Tenure, Ownership,
and Transition of Agricultural Land (TOTAL) survey to shed new light on these issues.
This large, rich, cross sectional data set provides an unprecedented perspective on farm
financial behavior. In addition to detailed household and farm production characteristics,
TOTAL collected detailed data on energy lease participation and income. Further, TOTAL
included questions on whether a farm had difficulty accessing credit and made any capital
or land investments. TOTAL contains other information not typically included in ARMS
that may otherwise be unobservable, such as time to intended retirement or transition and
a risk preferences score.
This study uses stratified propensity score matching (PSM) to assess the impact of en-
ergy leases on participating farm businesses’ capital investment, net income, and credit
constraints. The TOTAL data set is exceptionally well-suited to analysis using PSM, al-
lowing us to mitigate selection bias arising from systematic differences in the observable
characteristics of farms that do and do not host energy projects. We can also contrast im-
pacts associated with leasing oil or gas rights compared with other types of on-farm leases
(for example hunting and renewable energy leases).
Our results suggest that energy production income is of minor importance to most
of the farms that receive it. In particular, there is no evidence of an impact on credit
constraints; farms with energy income were no more or less likely to report difficulty
borrowing. We also found no significant effects on the amount of capital spending or
overall net farm income. That said, farms with energy income were significantly more
likely to report some capital investment (of any amount) and were significantly less likely
to have negative net farm income.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is tempting to think of the countryside as something timeless, a place isolated from
(if not antithetical to) industrialization. However, energy development on farmland is as
old as U.S. energy industries themselves. Hamilton McClintock of Cornplanter Town-
ship, Pennsylvania may have been the first American farmer to sign an oil lease in 1859,
just months after the first U.S. oil well started production (Hill, 2011). The nation’s first
large-scale electrical power plant, George Westinghouse’s famous hydroelectric station at
Niagara Falls, had great difficulty persuading farmers to sell land for a 30-foot-wide trans-
mission corridor; the final route’s loops and detours reflect dozens of compromises with
landowners unwilling to give up productive cropland or demanding a route that skirted,
rather than cut across, their fields (Dunlap, 1896). Later, farmland leases played a role
in the birth of renewable electricity industries: rancher Hugh Walker leased the land for
the United States first utility-scale wind farm at Altamont Pass (Sussman, 1981). A cur-
sory glance through the historical record finds that contemporary questions about energy
development on farmland–the importance of energy royalties to struggling farms (United
States Senate, 1980), damage to farmland due to energy production (Bennett, 1968), risks
assumed by farmers with an energy lease (Castleberry Jr, 1957), disruption to local agricul-
tural economies (Parcher, 1947), and impacts on farmland prices (Salisbury, 1941)–have
been matters of concern and study for generations.
That said, the pattern and the pace of energy development on agricultural land has
changed dramatically over the last decade. Improved hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and
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horizontal drilling techniques revolutionized the U.S. oil and gas industries, allowing prof-
itable exploration of vast oil- and gas-bearing shale formations. These technological ad-
vances triggered a rush by drilling firms to secure exploration and extraction leases, often
in areas with little history of oil and gas production. Between 2000 and 2012, almost 7
million acres of pasture and cropland were converted into drilling pads and associated in-
frastructure (Allred et al., 2015), an area slightly larger than Massachusetts. A decade into
large-scale unconventional oil and gas production, its impact on participating farms and
local agricultural economies is still a matter of intense debate.
The last decade also saw a dramatic drop in the cost of wind and solar power that,
in conjunction with widespread development incentives, prompted rapid growth in gener-
ating capacity. From 2008 through 2017, net generation from U.S. wind power grew by
359%. Utility-scale solar generation grew an incredible 6029% over the same period (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2018b). Despite disagreement about the likely pace
of expansion, most mainstream projections anticipate that U.S. wind and solar power will
continue to grow over the the coming decades (Heinrich et al., 2015; U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration, 2018a). In the long term, this expansion may have even greater
implications for rural landowners than the shale gas revolution. Compared to the total area
of the United States, the amount of land that will be affected by renewable energy ex-
pansion is trivial; however, that growth is likely to disproportionately affect farmland. The
ideal tract of land for solar development is flat, dry, unshaded, close to transmission infras-
tructure and customers, accessible to installers and maintenance, with few near neighbors,
and in an area with high solar radiation. All of these characteristics are associated with
farmland. Proximity to existing infrastructure is even more important for wind develop-
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ment, a key reason why 93% of U.S. wind power is located on rangeland or cropland
(Xiarchos and Sandborn, 2017).
To its supporters, energy development is an obvious win-win proposition, allowing
land-rich but cash-poor producers to gain a new stream of income in exchange for a small
percentage of an area’s farmland. Critics, however, fret that turning productive farmland
over to gas wells and solar panels will contribute to a long-term loss of agricultural land
and raise the costs of farming in areas attractive for energy development. In this context,
it is important to ask those old questions about conflicts between agricultural and energy
stakeholders again, taking into account new realities about how and where energy develop-
ment is taking place. A better understanding of the effects of energy development on both
participating farms and local agricultural economies can contribute to better outcomes for
farmers, planners, and energy companies alike.
1.1 Research objectives
This thesis contributes to the literature on rural energy development by answering two key
questions.
First, what are the characteristics of farm businesses that choose to participate in energy
leases? We use logistic regressions to identify attributes of farm businesses associated
with a greater or lesser likelihood of reporting energy production income. To adequately
address this issue, we also test for differences in how different sizes and types of farms
respond to local energy development and examine whether the the characteristics of farms
with oil or gas leases differ from those of farms leasing land for other non-agricultural
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purposes.
Second, what are the impacts of energy leases on the long-term viability of host farms?
We use propensity score matching to isolate the impacts of energy lease income on capital
investment, net farm income, and credit constraints. Again, we run variations of our model
to test for differences across broad types of farms and between farms receiving oil and gas
income vs. other lease income.
1.2 Methods and organization
This study uses confidential farm-level data from the USDA’s 2014 Tenure, Ownership,
and Transition of Agricultural Land (TOTAL) survey. The National Agricultural Statistics
Service, in collaboration with the USDA Economic Research Service, used TOTAL to
gather data on agricultural landowners’ income, expenses, debt, assets, and demographic
characteristics. While similar to the annual Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS), TOTAL collected much more detailed financial information than ARMS and did
not focus on specific commodities. It is part of the U.S. Census of Agriculture.
To identify the characteristics of farms that choose to participate in energy leases, we
use a series of logistic regressions with sampling weights provided by the USDA and
errors clustered by state. The base specification uses a simple binomial outcome variable
reflecting whether a given farm reported any income from energy production. We then
repeat the regression with two alternative outcome variables reflecting whether the given
farm received significant income from energy production, defined as as 50% of of net farm
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income (specification 2) or total energy income above $10,000. These variations test the
robustness of our conclusions and provide additional insight into the factors driving farms’
decisions on energy development.
After applying sampling weights, outcomes from the above specifications should re-
flect the population of U.S. farm owner-operators. However, this is not our only population
of interest. The 3-category USDA typology used in TOTAL defines 60% of U.S. farms as
“residence” family farms that are (1) operated by a part-time or retired farmer and (2) have
less than $350,000 in annual gross cash farm income (GCFI) (Hoppe and MacDonald,
2013). Although the majority of U.S. farms are residence operations, they represent just
6.2% of U.S. agricultural production by value. “Commercial” farms (family farms with
GCFI over $350,000 and all nonfamily farms) or “intermediate” farms (full-time farmers1
with GCFI under $350,000) produce 79% and 14.8%, respectively, of U.S. agricultural
value. Since intermediate and commercial farms are disproportionately important to the
U.S. agricultural economy, we repeated the regressions above while omitting residence
farms from the sample.
Next, we ran a series of regressions to tease out differences in the characteristics of
farms participating in oil and gas leases compared to other types of non-agricultural leases.
We used two simple binary outcome variables reflecting whether a given farm (1) had
leased oil or gas rights for any land owned by that operation and (2) had leased other
rights on land owned by the operation.
1More precisely, farms in the intermediate category have primary operators who report farming as their
primary occupation.
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Having identified characteristics of farms participating in energy leases, we assess the
impacts of energy lease income on participating farms using propensity score matching.
For each of the 29,733 farms in the TOTAL sample, we estimate the likelihood that a farm
with its known characteristics would be in the treatment group for each of the outcome
variables described above. The resulting propensity scores allow us to match each treated
farm with a similar untreated operation (a “nearest neighbor” algorithm) and compare
outcomes in terms of capital investment, net farm income, and credit constraints.
Following this introductory chapter:
Chapter 2 reviews prior research into the characteristics of farms leasing land for
energy development and the effect of energy leases on farm businesses. We also draw
on the relevant literature on off-farm income, farmers’ propensity to invest income from
various sources, and prevalence and effect of credit constraints on U.S. farms.
Chapter 3 describes the data used in this paper. The principal source is the USDA’s
2014 TOTAL survey, but this is complemented by data collected by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau and others.
Chapter 4 lays out theoretical frameworks for participation in an energy lease and for
impacts of energy income on farm viability, followed by a description of the empirical
models used in this thesis.
Chapter 5 relates the results of analysis of the characteristics of farms that choose to
participate in energy leases, looking at all U.S. farms and several populations of interest.
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Chapter 6 lays out the results of analysis on the effects of energy lease income on
participating farms.
Chapter 7 summarizes findings and delves into the implications for farmers, energy
developers, and policymakers. It also highlights unanswered questions and suggests av-
enues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Renewable energy development on farmland
Within the broader literature on renewable energy siting, at least three studies using data
from the USDA (NASS) 2009 On-Farm Renewable Energy Production Survey (OFREPS)
have analyzed factors influencing farms’ adoption of solar or wind technology1. Xiarchos
and Lazarus (2013) found a strong positive correlation with energy prices, organic acres
per farm, rural internet connectivity and, for solar adoption, farmer tenure. The authors
observed a negative correlation with market share of electric cooperatives (which are ex-
empt from some relevant state and federal regulations). Of state policies considered, only
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) appeared to stimulate adoption by farms. Beckman
and Xiarchos (2013) used a double-hurdle model to examine the characteristics of farms
that installed a PV system of any size in California and, among adopters, traits associ-
ated with relatively large (or relatively small) systems. Farms with commercial-scale PV
systems (as opposed to those intended primarily for on-farm consumption) had:
• More capital investment (twice the average value of machinery);
• Fewer total acres, but more valuable farmland (both in terms of per-acre value total
property value);
• Operators with more years of agricultural experience;
1Note that OFREPS did not collect data on wind generating facilities of 100kw or greater nameplate
capacity.
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• Greater reliance on farm income as a percentage of the household budget; and,
• Greater energy consumption (in terms of $ /year).
In a nationwide study the following year, Borchers et al. (2014) found that state-level
net metering and interconnection policies favoring small electricity producers effectively
promoted renewable energy installation on farms; cost incentives (e.g., grants, rebates, and
tax credits) and state renewable portfolio standards seemed to have little, if any, impact in
this regard.
Fewer studies specifically address wind development on U.S. farms, likely because
wind leases are less common than solar and because wind turbines are easier to colocate
with continued agricultural production than utility-scale solar. NREL estimated that the
average U.S. wind farm directly and permanently affected just .75 acres per MW in capac-
ity (Denholm et al., 2009) compared to 7.3 acres directly affected per MW for large-scale
solar (Ong et al., 2013). Access to transmission infrastructure remains a substantial chal-
lenge for wind developers. To a greater extent than for solar development, the country’s
most productive locations for onshore wind turbines (typically open plains or exposed up-
lands) are often sparsely settled and remote from population centers (Brown et al., 2017).
The pattern of wind farm expansion on the Great Plains has followed transmission infras-
tructure as much as wind resource quality. North Texas offers an excellent case study,
as its Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) transmission network enabled the
state to greatly outpace wind capacity growth in states with comparable wind resources
(Orrell et al., 2016). Based on interviews with 23 Scottish farmers applying for wind
development permits, Sutherland and Holstead (2014) reported that participating farmers
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saw wind power primarily as a diversification strategy. While many farms in the area
had exploitable wind resources, the farmers actively pursuing development were dispro-
portionately owner-operators with large landholdings. The authors also stressed up-front
permitting costs and opposition from close neighbors as significant barriers to develop-
ment on smaller farms.
Figure 2.1: Great Plains wind farms mapped on wind resources and trans-
mission lines
Utility-scale wind farms mapped on major
long-distance transmission lines.
Wind farms and wind resource quality, using
a scale of poor (darkest brown) to superior
(darkest blue) wind resources.
Created using the Energy Information Agency’s U.S. Energy Mapping System.
Since local support or opposition has a strong impact on the speed and cost of wind
development (Chen and MacDonald, 2011), it is also important to consider key predictors
of local opposition to wind farms. Public attitudes toward wind farms influence whether
and where farmland will remain attractive for wind development, as well as the benefits
of development for landowners. Studies of attitudes toward wind power in the United
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States suggest that greater proximity to a proposed wind farm site is correlated with more
negative attitudes toward the project; however, this effect is not apparent for active wind
farms (Swofford and Slattery, 2010; Jacquet, 2012; Slattery et al., 2012). There is some
evidence that support for local wind farm development is tied to expectations that wind
power will support local economic growth, even for individuals who do not expect to
benefit personally Slattery et al. (2012); Brannstrom et al. (2011). The perceived scenic
value of the wind farm site (and perceived aesthetic appeal of wind turbines) also seem
to be significant (Groothuis et al., 2008). Residential real estate values near proposed and
operating wind farms may be a useful proxy for local acceptance of wind development.
The most comprehensive U.S. study of the effect of wind development on property values
is Hoen et al. (2011), which drew on data for almost 7,500 sales near U.S. wind farms and
found no significant effects associated with proximity to or views of wind turbines.
Bigelow et al. (2016) used TOTAL data and a discrete choice model to identify at-
tributes of non-operating agricultural landlords associated with higher (or lower) propen-
sity to exercise non-agricultural (secondary) use rights on farmland that they owned. The
study examined predictors for several specific non-agricultural uses, including oil and gas
leases and wind leases. The researchers found that landlords were more likely to lease
wind rights if they allowed their tenants to make decisions regarding government program
enrollment (possibly indicating that the landlord has less day-to-day involvement with
farm management); if the rented land was in a county with high wind potential; and, curi-
ously, if the farmland was leased (at least in part) for a share of its agricultural production.
There was no significant relationship between wind leases and per-acre agricultural rent,
corporate ownership, or landlords residing in a different county than the rented farmland.
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In addition, there are many works on the identification of land for solar development
more generally and willingness of landowners to participate. A 2015 study produced a
system for estimating the suitability of a given parcel of land based on environmental and
social constraints (Brewer et al., 2015). Brewer et al. inferred desirable physical charac-
teristics for siting from the location of existing solar installations with greater than 1 MW
capacity. Social constraints were derived from a survey on public attitudes toward buffer
zones between solar farms and agricultural, residential, and other land types. Combined,
these models identify parcels likely to be technically, financially, and socially acceptable
for solar development. Carlisle et al. (2016) emphasized the visual impact of proposed
solar facilities, and found that public support varied considerably depending on a parcel’s
current land use and the size of a buffer between the project site and land deemed to be
socially or environmentally valuable (e.g., recreation areas and wildlife breeding grounds).
There may be similarities between farms that are willing to retire land for renewable
energy development and those participating in long-term conservation investments such as
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Both Claassen and Morehart (2009) and Soule
et al. (2000) found that low-tenure farmers (those who own a relatively small percentage of
the land that they farm) were significantly less likely to enroll in the CRP or to adopt farm-
ing practices promoting long-term productivity of the soil. However, Soule et al. state that
share-renters may have more incentive and opportunity to participate in conservation prac-
tices, noting that they are no less likely than owner-operators to use conservation tillage
while cash renters are significantly less likely to do so.
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2.2 Oil and gas development on farmland
Many farmland owners have clearly benefited from the shale boom of the last decade, as
many shale-bearing formations lie under productive agricultural regions (see Figure 2.2).
By 2012, 35% of active U.S. farm and ranch land was in a county producing oil or gas from
a shale play (Hitaj and Suttles, 2016). In areas conducive to shale gas development, farm-
ers receive more income from energy leases and royalties than from government farm pay-
ments (Brown et al., 2016). Weber et al. (2013) estimated that the average farm household
receiving revenue from an energy lease (most commonly oil and gas) gained $104,000 in
net worth and that energy royalty payments to farmers totaled $2.3 billion in 2011. These
payments were, however, highly concentrated among farmers; the median annual payment
was just $7,000.
In a study of the terms of oil and gas leases in 16 states, Brown et al. (2016) found
substantial variation in the average royalty rate (from a low of 13.2% in the Marcellus to
21.2% in the Permian play). Interestingly, royalty rates are only weakly correlated with
resource abundance at a given site; the land leasing market for gas development is far from
perfectly competitive, likely due to uncertainty and asymmetries in the information avail-
able to rights holders and developers (Brown et al., 2016; Fish, 2011). Prior researchers
have also found evidence of variation in lease and royalty rates based on owners attitudes
toward development risks (Timmins and Vissing, 2014) and the concentration of minority
households in an area (Vissing, 2015).
There is some evidence that farms’ responses to local shale gas development vary
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Figure 2.2: Map of oil- and gas-bearing shale formations
with farm operation size. Reporting on interviews with farmers in the Marcellus shale
play, Malin and DeMaster (2016) suggested that smaller, financially marginal farmers were
more likely to sign gas leases. Several lessors in their interviews reported that the income
from energy leases made it possible for them to keep farming or to pay for household
essentials like health insurance. Using 2007 and 2012 county-level data for the Marcellus
shale region, Xiarchos (2017) found that farms in counties that hosted unconventional gas
drilling spent more on capital and equipment. However, the study also found evidence that
farming in those counties was more consolidated, with fewer but larger operations; the
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authors noted that the difference in capital and equipment spending could be the result of
smaller farms ceasing operations.
Multiple studies suggest that oil and gas leasing in an area drives up per-acre property
values. A 2013 study found that the per-acre value of an acre of farmland rose $2.60
for each $1 in energy lease payments received by the landowner (Weber et al., 2013). A
2015 study reported that per-acre farmland prices rose 48% in the Marcellus shale play
in Pennsylvania (Weber and Hitaj, 2015). Farmland prices also rose in other major shale
plays, though less dramatically. The authors hypothesized that the difference was due
to an unusually low rate of split estates (subsurface mineral rights owned by a different
entity than surface property) in the Marcellus. Xiarchos (2017) also observed faster growth
in median farmland value between 2007 and 2012 within Marcellus region counties that
contained unconventional gas wells. These conclusions are supported by research focusing
on the impacts of shale gas development on land values more broadly (i.e., not confined to
farmland). In a study of residential property sales in Pennsylvania and New York, Boslett
et al. (2016) found that a ban on hydraulic fracturing in New York (largely blocking shale
gas development in the state) led to 23% lower land values for parcels suitable for shale
gas production.
The apparent impact of energy development on land prices suggests that farmers with
the least to gain and most to lose from energy development may be those who depend on
rented farmland. A study using 2014 TOTAL data found that nonoperating farm owners
are 50% more likely to enter into oil and gas development leases than farm owner-operators
(Hitaj et al., 2018). The likelihood is even higher if the landlord lives in a different county.
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Similarly, in their study of land use decisions by single-tenant agricultural landlords (see
previous section), Bigelow et al. (2016) found that geographically distant landlords and
those with share-based agreements with their tenant were more likely to lease oil and
gas rights. Landlords were less likely to sign such leases for higher-value farmland (in
terms of agricultural rent per acre). Attributes associated with and oil or gas lease were
quite different than those for a wind lease; only share-based agricultural leases were a
significant predictor for both.
Some externalities associated with oil and gas development affect all farms in an area,
not just those that receive energy lease or royalty income. This is relevant to our work
insofar as landowners’ decisions regarding energy development are influenced by how they
expect nearby landowners to behave. In some cases, farmers have reported feeling pressure
to sign energy leases due to an expectation that they will need to deal with negative impacts
from area energy development regardless of whether they choose to participate (Malin,
2014; Malin and DeMaster, 2016).
Using propensity score matching, Hoy et al. (2018) found evidence that gas devel-
opment in the Marcellus Shale encouraged consolidation in the agricultural sector. In
gas-producing counties, median farm size rose and the number of small farms fell relative
to non-shale counties. Xiarchos (2017) also found a correlation between drilling intensity
and a county having fewer, larger farms.
In areas of intense oil and gas production, farmers may compete with those industries
for water, transportation, and labor. Despite efficiency improvements by drilling compa-
nies (Rodriguez and Soeder, 2015), hydraulic fracturing is usually a water-intensive pro-
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cess. Depending on the shale play, the typical unconventional gas well consumes from 1.5
million liters (California’s Niobrara formation) to 23.8 million liters (Oklahoma’s Wood-
ford formation) of water (Kondash and Vengosh, 2015). While water useage by the shale
oil/gas industry is not particularly large by national or state standards2, it can significantly
strain local resources. In a report for Ceres, Freyman (2014) notes that almost 39% of
hydraulically fractured wells drilled since 2011 are in counties under “extremely high”
water stress (more than 80% of available water being used). Farah (2017) found strong
evidence that consumption of water for hydraulic fracturing in Alberta decreased yield for
irrigated crops nearby. Farmers also compete with oil and gas companies for water in the
United States, notably in Oklahoma and Texas (Cooley and Donnelly, 2012; Hitaj et al.,
2014). While some farmers benefit by selling groundwater to energy companies, there is
no effective mechanism to ensure that groundwater users are proportionately compensated
(Allen, 2012). Transportation constraints in some shale plays have “shut in” some agricul-
tural production, leading to lower commodity prices for area farmers. In 2014, a bumper
crop combined with high demands for rail transport from oil producers led to serious trans-
portation problems for farmers in the northern plains and upper Midwest (Prater, 2014). In
North Dakota, the hardest-hit state, farmers lost between $66.6 and $162 million (Olson,
2014). Farms in energy-producing areas may need to pay higher prices for labor. Several
studies suggest that growth in oil and gas production drives up an area’s overall wage level,
both through energy companies competing with other employers for local workers (Weber
and Key, 2014; Deede, 2014) and by non-local workers increasing demand for housing
and services (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015).
2For instance, it constitutes less than 2.5% of total water useage for mining in the United States and
barely 0.1% of the water used for irrigation (Donnelly and Cooley, 2015).
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Finally, farmers are not immune to the broader socioeconomic changes, both positive
and negative, that arrive with energy development in their communities. A rich sociolog-
ical literature deals with the social benefits and risks of rapid energy development. The
shale gas revolution, in particular, prompted notable works by Brasier et al. (2011, 2015),
Jacquet (2014), Ladd (2013), Perry (2012), and many others. It is difficult to generalize
about the social impacts of an energy boom, both because those impacts vary from one
community to the next and because the perceptions of change vary dramatically within
communities. For some residents, an energy boom may bring improved government ser-
vices, greater local educational and professional opportunities, and a sense of local iden-
tity and pride. Others in the same community may struggle to adjust to a larger and more
transient population, greater income inequality, and changing work patterns. Illustrating
this divide, research in Pennsylvania by Jacquet (2012) suggests that landowners’ atti-
tudes toward shale gas drilling vary dramatically depending on whether they directly ben-
efit. Roughly 60% of landowners receiving lease and royalty income believe that drilling
has made their community “better” or “much better”; the same percentage of landowners
receiving no income from drilling believe it makes their community “worse” or “much
worse”3. Most of these intangible costs and benefits fall beyond the scope of this thesis.
Nevertheless, these and similar factors may influence both the willingness of farmers to
lease land for energy development and participating farmers’ plans for the future.
3This study also considered landowner attitudes toward wind power development. Landowners receiving
royalty income from wind turbines were more likely to see a positive community impact, but landowners
receiving no income from wind turbines were no more likely to have negative perceptions of wind develop-
ment.
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2.3 Income smoothing
The relatively consistent revenue stream from energy leases may act as a hedge against
volatile crop prices and unpredictable weather. A 2013 study found a positive correlation
between agricultural price volatility and farmers’ willingness to lease land for solar devel-
opment (Gazheli and Di Corato, 2013). The predictability of payments from this type of
energy lease is also important. Farm households tend to treat outside income from variable
sources (e.g. net farm income, insurance payments) differently than equivalent, but more
predictable payments (e.g. decoupled support payments, off-farm salary income). Farmers
are more willing to reinvest proceeds from the latter to increase production or productivity,
rather than saving or consuming. Data from energy leases suggest that farm households
perceive such lease income to be “moderately stable”: it is less likely to be consumed (and
more likely to be invested) than traditionally predictable payment sources, but more likely
to be consumed than variable sources like net farm income (Weber et al., 2013). These
hypotheses are reinforced by qualitative studies, like those of Malin and DeMaster (2016),
reporting that the reliability of lease income is frequently cited as an important factor for
farmers who have chosen to participate.
In this context, it is important to note that different kinds of energy leases have varying
potential for income smoothing. Fossil fuel leases can produce a windfall during extrac-
tion, but the period of production is comparatively brief. Production of oil and gas drops
even more quickly in wells drilled with hydraulic fracturing than in “conventional” wells.
A study by King (2014) found that, without re-fracking, average production dropped by
70% over the first year. Wind or solar leases, in contrast, often last more than 20 years
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(Farm Bureau New York, 2016; NY-SUN, 2016). These differences may affect the extent
to which farmers reinvest lease income.
2.4 Credit-constrained farms
There is strong evidence of credit constraints for certain types of farmers, particularly
newer farmers (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2012) or those with higher debt levels (Bierlen
and Featherstone, 1998), that negatively impact farm productivity. Using propensity score
matching (average treatment effect on the treated), Briggeman et. al studied the effects of
credit constraints on U.S. sole-proprietorship farms and non-farm businesses (Briggeman
et al., 2009). While credit constraints led to minor impacts on overall agricultural output,
approximately 10.5% of U.S. farms lack sufficient access to credit. Credit constraints
are a major issue for farm households affected. The value of a credit-constrained farm’s
production was almost $40,000 less than would otherwise be expected.
When banks and other financial institutions are unwilling to extend credit, farmers may
look for other income derived from their farmland income to finance agricultural invest-
ment. Duke et al. (2016) found evidence that unprofitable (often credit-constrained) farm-
ers are more likely than profitable farmers to reinvest conservation easement payments into
their farms. The authors hypothesized that liquidity from conservation easement programs
corrected a credit-market failure preventing some farmers from operating efficiently.
Interestingly, farm operators treat off-farm income (e.g., a household member’s salary
from a job “in town”) differently than non-farming income that is nonetheless derived
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from farmland (e.g., conservation easement payments). Gedikoglu and McCann (2007)
found that farm households used off-farm income to compensate for the unpredictability
and variability of farming income. Harris et al. (2010) reported that farm households with
off-farm income were less likely to invest in the farm. If a household with off-farm income
did decide to invest in the farm, the presence of off-farm income did not increase the size of
that investment. A study by Whitaker (2009) found that farm households had dramatically
different short-term propensities to consume income from different sources, likely due to
their perceived volatility. Households’ marginal propensity to consume farm production
income or unpredictable government income (loan deficiency payments and marketing
loan gains) was just one-tenth that of off-farm income. Off-farm income, in turn, was less
than half as likely to be consumed as decoupled subsidy payments, which are quite stable
from year to year.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA SOURCES
The principal source of data for this study is the 2014 TOTAL survey, conducted by the
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) in collaboration with the USDA
Economic Research Service (ERS). TOTAL collected detailed financial and land manage-
ment information from 29,733 farmland owner-operators in the continental United States1.
This study uses farm-level data, with location specified down to the county level. Includ-
ing those derived by ERS, the data set includes more than 1,500 variables. It the first
national survey of its type since the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership
Survey (AELOS), though TOTAL and AELOS results are not directly comparable due to
differences in methodology (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015).
We based the binary treatment variables used for propensity score matching on ques-
tions 555, 7020, and 7026 from the TOTAL questionnaire. These questions, respectively,
asked respondents to report income from “royalties or leases associated with energy pro-
duction (e.g. natural gas, oil, and wind turbines)”; acres of owned land with the oil and gas
rights leased out; and acres of owned land with other rights leased out. “Treated” farms
were all those reporting income from the relevant source.
Of the 29,733 farm businesses in the TOTAL sample, 1,550 reported receiving income
from energy production. A few farms reported very large payments (up to $4.15 million).
However, the median payment was just $6,000.
1The TOTAL survey does not cover Alaska, Hawaii, or U.S. territories.
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Figure 3.1: Income from energy production, participating farms
TOTAL is not a representative sample of U.S. farms, and reweighting is necessary to
extend any conclusions from the sample to U.S. farms more broadly. ERS collected larger
samples in the 25 states with the highest agricultural cash receipts. The likelihood of a
given farm being in the TOTAL sample also increased based on its USDA-calculated farm
value of sales.
3.1 County socioeconomic characteristics
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of farms in the TOTAL sample
vs. all U.S. farms
Mean per operation: TOTAL All U.S. farms1
Acres operated 946 acres 434 acres
Operator age 54.4 years 58.3 years
Net farm income $161,821 $43,750
Value of farm equipment $277,705 $115,706
(1) Summary per-operation statistics, 2012 Census of Agriculture
While the TOTAL data
set includes a great deal
of detail about the farm
businesses surveyed, it
does not always include
relevant socioeconomic
information about those
farms’ surroundings. These
gaps are important, since
decisions about develop-
ment of farmland must take into account many local factors. For example, one might ex-
pect energy development to face fewer obstacles in counties with lower population density,
lower average incomes, or a more conservative population. We incorporated county-level
census data to account for these and other local conditions.
3.2 Energy production, transmission, and consumption
Unsurprisingly, the energy leases reported in TOTAL are geographically concentrated in
areas with accessible energy resources. To account for variation in resource endowments2,
we incorporated county- and state-level data on crude oil, natural gas, wind electricity,
and solar electricity production. This also allows us to correct for legal and regulatory
2TOTAL does include a question asking respondents about the value of mineral or other rights owned by
the farm business. We opted not to use this variable, as it seems unlikely that landowners who have not sold,
leased, or surveyed their mineral or other rights would have an accurate estimate of this value.
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differences between jurisdictions (e.g., New York’s ban on hydraulic fracturing) that make
energy development more or less likely.
Oil and gas production
We use Energy Information Administration (EIA) data on production of crude oil and nat-
ural gas. At the county level, 2011 oil and gas production figures are the most recent avail-
able. The model also reflects whether county production is rising or falling significantly,
based on the production volume change between 2000 and 2011. Since 2011 data might
not capture the surge in production from unconventional sources, the model also uses the
EIA’s 2014 state-level production figures for oil and gas at the state level, adjusted for state
area. The EIA also publishes maps of known oil- or gas-bearing shale formations; we use
this data to estimate the likelihood that a given farm is located in a shale play.
Renewable energy potential and production
This study uses data from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Open PV
project to estimate the cumulative capacity of solar power installed in counties through the
end of 2014, complemented by EIA data on actual state-level net generation from solar.
We drew on hourly average solar irradiation estimates by Perez et al. (2002) as a proxy for
solar potential.
The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) database on large wind projects is
our source for estimated county wind generating capacity. We also relied on NREL’s data
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Table 3.2: Sources of energy-related data
American Wind Energy Association (AWEA)
County wind generating capacity (2014)
Energy Information Administration (EIA)
County oil and gas production (2011) County decline or growth of production 2001-11
State oil/gas production per square mile (2014) Shale formation boundaries
State wind and solar net generation (2014) State average retail electricity prices (2014)
State average retail natural gas prices (2014)
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
Estimated wind power potential (1986) County solar generating capacity (2014)
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Transmission infrastructure density
Perez et al. (2002)
Estimated hourly average solar irradiation
to estimate wind resource endowment by county (Elliott et al., 1986; U.S. Department of
Energy, 2015). NREL uses a 7-point scale for wind power potential at various heights;
this study uses estimates for on-shore wind at 50 meters.
3.3 Transmission infrastructure density
Proximity to transmission infrastructure has a major impact on the cost of large-scale
wind and solar development. Using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data on the
approximate location of high-voltage transmission lines, we generated a rough measure
of electrical infrastructure density by calculating the length of lines in each county and
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adjusting for area (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2017).
3.4 Electricity and natural gas retail prices
In addition, we used EIA data on average state electricity prices and residential natural
gas prices in 2014 as the basis for covariates in the propensity score algorithm. As noted
above, Beckman and Xiarchos (2013) found a strong link between electricity prices and
the propensity of farmers to adopt renewable energy technologies. Since free or discounted
natural gas is sometimes part of a drilling lease (particularly for smaller, shallower wells)
(Weidner, 2015), it seems reasonable to believe that high natural gas prices would make
landowners more willing to lease land for gas drilling.
3.5 Other data sources
Finally, we incorporated county-level data on political beliefs and internet access. Pre-
vious research by Beckman and Xiarchos (2013), Borchers et al. (2014), and Xiarchos
and Lazarus (2013) found these characteristics to be important predictors of wind and so-
lar power adoption at the farm level3. We used counties’ results in the 2016 presidential
election, as compiled by McGovern (2016), as a proxy for an area’s liberalism or con-
servatism. The Federal Communications Commission reports county-level data on fixed
Internet connections twice annually. This study uses data on residential connections of
at least 200 kilobytes per second per 1,000 county households as of December 31, 2014
3The TOTAL survey did not ask respondents about their political beliefs or their access to the internet.
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(Federal Communications Commission, 2016).
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CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To guide our empirical work, we adapted theoretical models for (1) an owner-
operator’s decision to participate (or not) in energy development, (2) the impact of energy
production income on farm income and spending, and (3) farm credit constraints.
4.1 Theoretical model of energy lease participation
Following Borchers et al. (2014), we hypothesize that the observed outcome of a farm re-
porting energy production income (a binary outcome that we will call Lease) is generated
by an unobservable variable Lease*. Lease* represents the owner-operator’s net expected
benefits of leasing oil, gas, wind, or solar development rights. Lease* will be positive
if the expected value from energy development (lease payments, royalties, and any other
benefits expected from a potential developer, assumed to be ≥ 0) exceed the expected tan-
gible and intangible value from alternative uses of that land and any disamenities from
energy development1.
This study also assumes that the owner-operator’s expected benefits and costs of en-
ergy leasing are a function of characteristics of the operating household (e.g., age and
assets), farm operations (e.g., acres operated and value of production), and its physical
and human geography (e.g., energy resources and socioeconomic surroundings). In addi-
tion, we allow for correlation between farms in the same state. This reflects variation in
1Some owner-operators in the TOTAL sample may receive income from energy production despite not
consenting to energy development. Shared oil and gas resources, for instance, may be developed over the
objection of a minority of rights-holders (often known as “forced pooling”).
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policies and regulation, not otherwise reflected in observed farm and area characteristics,
that nevertheless can impact likelihood of energy development (Xiarchos and Lazarus,
2013; Borchers et al., 2014). Individual states have a great deal of leeway to decide how to
permit, regulate, and tax energy production. In particular, many states impose restrictions
on developing farmland that make energy production more difficult or expensive (Ifft et al.,
2018).
Letting Xi j represent a vector of those independent variables for owner-operator i in
jurisdiction j, the net expected benefits are generated by the following function. Both the
farm-level and state-level random error terms (i and µ j, respectively) are assumed to have
a normal distribution.
Leasei j∗ = Xi jβ + i + µ j (4.1)
The relationship between Leasei j* and the observed outcome is:
Leasei j =

1, if Leasei j∗ > 0
0, otherwise
(4.2)
In this model, the probability that a given farm will report energy production income is:
P(Leasei j = 1) = P(Xi jβ + i + µ j > 0) (4.3)
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4.2 Empirical model: logistic regression
We used multiple logistic regressions to identify factors that influence participation or
non-participation in energy leasing. Our final model handily satisfies the assumptions of
logistic regression. A series of diagnostic tests, detailed below, suggest minimal multi-
collinearity, linearity of independent variables and log odds, and high goodness of fit.
We estimate the log odds of farm i in state j having income from energy production
with logistic regression, using covariates (x1,x2, etc.) that prior research suggest may play
a role in leasing decisions. As noted above, standard errors are clustered by state to reflect
variation in policies and regulation that are not fully explained by our covariates. The
resulting functional form is:
Leasei j = ln(
P(yi j = 1
1 − (P(yi j = 1))
= β0 + (β1 × x1i j) + (β2 × x2i j) + ... + (βm × xmi j) + i + µ j
(4.4)
Results reported in section 5 reflect TOTAL-supplied sample weights to compensate for
known differences between the sampled population and the actual population of U.S.
farms.
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4.2.1 Dependent variable and alternative specifications
Base specification
The dependent variable in the base specification simply reflects whether a farm reported
any income from energy production in 2014. 1,550 of the 29,733 owner-operators sur-
veyed for TOTAL reported some energy income.
Alternative energy income variables
Table 4.1: Number of treatment and control observa-
tions, by specification
Treatment
group
Control
group
ANY energy production in-
come
1,550 28,183
Energy income ≥ 50% of net
farm income
679 29,054
Energy income ≥ $10,000 616 29,117
Since the median energy pro-
duction payment to partic-
ipating farms is relatively
small (see Figure 3.1), it
is important to consider whether
the results of the base spec-
ification hold if we define
a more selective treatment
group. We report results for
two variations on the base variation specification that focus on energy payments that are
“substantial” in either relative or absolute terms. A farm operator may weigh the costs
and benefits of an energy lease based on the size of expected payments relative to net farm
income. As such, our first variation limits the treatment group to farms that received at
least 50% of net farm income from energy production income in 2014 (679 farms in the
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sample). It may also make sense to differentiate between smaller and larger energy devel-
opment deals. The dependent variable for the second variable is whether a farm received
at least $10,000 (616 farms).
Alternative population: intermediate- and commercial-scale farms
Figure 4.1: U.S. farms and agricultural production, by
USDA farm type
Data from Hoppe and MacDonald (2013)
Some 60% of U.S. farms
are classified as “residence”
operations by the USDA:
farms with gross income be-
low $350,000 and an oper-
ator who does not consider
farming to be his/her primary
occupation (Hoppe and Mac-
Donald, 2013). However, the
vast majority of U.S. agri-
cultural production is by “in-
termediate” or “commercial”
farms. Intermediate farms
also have gross income be-
low $350,000, but the prin-
cipal operator considers farming to be his or her primary occupation. Commer-
cial farms either have gross sales greater than $350,000 or are nonfamily operations.
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Table 4.2: Professional farm variations: number of
treatment and control observations
Treatment
group
Control
group
ANY energy production in-
come
1,128 17,830
Energy income ≥ 50% of net
farm income
437 18,521
Energy income ≥ $10,000 473 18,485
All U.S. farms are in the
population of interest for the
above specifications. After
weighting, the results pre-
dominantly reflect expecta-
tions for residence farms.
However, given larger farms’
comparative importance in
U.S. agricultural output, it is important to consider whether they respond in the same way
to potential energy income. To address this issue, we repeated the three logistic regressions
described above using only the 18,958 farms in the TOTAL sample that were classified as
intermediate- or commercial-type operations by the USDA.
Oil and gas vs. other leases
Table 4.3: Oil and gas vs. other leases: number of treat-
ment and control observations
Treatment
group
Control
group
Leased oil or gas rights for
some acre(s) owned
1,400 28,333
Leased other rights for some
acre(s) owned
531 29,202
106 observations are in both treatment groups.
Finally, we compare the char-
acteristics of farms reporting
oil and gas leases to those
leasing other types of prop-
erty rights to shed light on
which, if any, attributes iden-
tified in our study are associ-
ated specifically with energy
leases as opposed to leases
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more broadly.
The TOTAL survey asks owner-operators if (a) oil and gas rights or (b) other rights
have been leased on any land owned by the farm business. We reduce these to simple
binomial outcomes comparable to those used above. These outcome variables reflect only
the presence or absence of a lease, not whether it has been developed or is currently gener-
ating income. Almost half (49.5%) of farms reporting an oil and gas lease did not receive
any energy production income in 20142. The oil and gas treatment group would not in-
clude farms that have sold land for hydrocarbon drilling or farmers affected by oil or gas
development on farmland that they rent from another landowner.
4.2.2 Selecting covariates
We identified potential covariates for based on prior research of important considerations
for farmers considering leasing land and economic theory. Working from this inclusive
list, we developed a relatively parsimonious logistic regression model through an iterative
process of (1) testing for multicollinearity, (2) identifying potentially redundant variables,
and (3) comparing the reduced and full models. Covariates used in the final specifications
of the predictive logistic model are described in the tables below.
A series of diagnostic tests shows no obvious violations of the assumptions under-
lying logistic regression. A variance inflation factor (VIF) test indicates relatively low
multicollinearity. The mean VIF for covariates in our final predictive model is 1.65; the
2See Appendix A for a tabulation of the overlap between farms that have leased oil and gas rights, those
that have leased other rights, and those that reported receiving energy production income.
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Table 4.4: Predictive logit model: farm business variables
Acres owned Total acres of farmland owned (not necessarily operated)
Conservation programs Income received from the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP), Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP),
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Conserva-
tion Security Program (CSP), and the Conservation Steward-
ship Program (CStP)
Contract Farm produced one or more commodity under a production or
marketing contract
Debt to asset ratio Ratio of total farm debt to total farm assets
Farm debts (total) Balance of loans outstanding at the end of 2014
Fixed costs Overhead expenses that do not vary with production
Land rented from others Percent of land operated that is rented from another landowner
Production specialty More than 50% of farm revenue is from livestock and animal
products; grains and oilseeds; fruits and vegetables; or none of
these.
Value of farm production Gross farm revenue
Table 4.5: Predictive logit model: farm operator and household variables
Age Principal operator’s age on December 31, 2014
Dependence on farm income Ratio of net farm to total household income
Education Highest level of education achieved by principal operator or spouse
Farming experience Years that the principal operator has run any farm
Female Principal operator identifies as a woman
Hours worked annually Hours worked on farm by principal operator, per year (1000s)
Non-farm assets Household assets not associated with farming
Non-farm debt (total) Principal on loans taken out for exclusively non-farm purposes
Off-farm income Household income from activities not associated with the farm busi-
ness or farm assets
Residence Principal operator lives on-farm
Retirement plans Whether the principal operator plans to retire from farming in the
next 5 years
Risk tolerance Self-reported willingness to take risks, on a 10-point scale
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Table 4.6: Predictive logit model: energy resource variables
County: crude oil production Total crude oil production in 2011
County: gas production Total natural gas production in 2011
County: production decline Value of oil and gas production fell by $10 million or more between
2000 and 2011
County: production increase Value of oil and gas production rose by $10 million or more between
2000 and 2011
County: relative solar potential Average annual solar irradiance in the given county, compared to
other U.S. counties (expressed as a percentile)
County: wind potential Best wind resource quality in the given county (50 meters above sur-
face), as assessed by the U.S. Department of Energy
State: electricity prices Average residential retail electricity price in 2014
State: crude oil production 2014 crude oil production, adjusted for state area
State: gas production 2014 natural gas production, adjusted for state area
State: wind production Net generation from wind in 2014, adjusted for state area
Table 4.7: Predictive logit model: socioeconomic surroundings
County: household income Income of median county household, 2010
County: internet access Internet connections per 1000 households
County: partisan lean Percent of county votes cast for Hilary Clinton in 2016 election
County: population density Average county population per square mile, 2010
County: racial diversity Percent of county self-identifying as white, 2010
State: electricity prices Average retail electricity price (all sectors) in county in 2014
State: natural gas prices Average retail natural gas price (all sectors) in county in 2014
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highest individual covariate’s VIF is 3.10. A Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test
(10 groups) produced a p-value of .6481, suggesting that our logistic model fits the data
quite well (Hosmer and Lemesbow, 1980). A link test for model specification, follow-
ing the method laid out in Pregibon (1980), is also encouraging, showing no evidence of
specification error.
Bidirectional (cyclic) causation is a potential problem with our data set, but can be
mitigated by using ordinal or binary rather than continuous variables. Many of the vari-
ables collected by the ARMS survey both influence and are influenced by energy lease
participation. For example, a given farmer’s household income would likely influence his
or her interest in signing an energy lease; energy lease participation also affects household
income. Thus, a continuous household income covariate could introduce bias. This risk
can, however, be greatly reduced by using a categorical household income covariate sepa-
rating farms into quartiles based on household income. Revenue from an energy lease can
make a meaningful difference in a household budget, but it is unlikely to shift a household
from one income quartile to another. As noted in chapter 3, the median farm reporting
energy production income received $6,000 in 2014. In relative terms, the median farm
received 3.1% of its gross income from energy production. The median payment in the
intermediate- and commercial-type farm sample was only slightly higher: $7,000.
4.2.3 Compensating for missing values of covariates
Only four of the relevant TOTAL covariates have missing data. However, the data is not
missing completely at random in relation to key farm characteristics. The table below
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illustrates this point by showing non-response rates for the three relevant covariates with
missing data, grouped by ERS farm typology. The simplest response to missing data, drop-
ping incomplete observations, is not tenable in these conditions. Excluding observations
with missing data would reduce our model’s power and could introduce bias (Mitra and
Reiter, 2011).
Table 4.8: Percent of observations missing data, by
farm type
Residence Intermediate Commercial
farms farms farms
Years of experience1 10.1% 14.6% 8.1%
Retirement plans2 3.9% 10.0% 4.6%
Risk tolerance3 3.1% 10.7% 4.7%
Off-farm income4 0% 0% 5.8%
Text in TOTAL questionnaire:
(1) In what year did the operator begin to operate ANY farm?
(2) Do you (the principal operator) plan to retire from farm
work within the next 5 years?
(3) Are you generally a person willing to take risks or do you
try to avoid taking risks?
(4) [What was] the total income the household, the principal
operator, and spouse received in 2014 from all off-farm wages,
salaries, and tips before taxes and withholdings?
We also decided against
imputing values for missing
data, as that would require
the dubious assumption that
missingness (m) is indepen-
dent of the relevant vari-
able’s value conditional upon
a vector of known indepen-
dent variables (Sterne et al.,
2009): f (Yx|X,m = 0) =
f (Yx|X,m = 1). Rather,
the relationship between be-
tween Yx and X may vary de-
pending on whether Yx is ob-
served. The nonresponding
group may have some oth-
erwise unobserved common
characteristic. For example,
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farmers considering retirement might skip the TOTAL question asking about retirement
plans (see above) because it does not allow for uncertainty.
A more conservative assumption is that the data is missing not at random. Under
this assumption, we added a “did not respond” category for each of the four covariates
specified.
4.3 Theoretical model: impacts of energy production income on net
farm income and capital investment
In the TOTAL survey, energy production income on land owned by a farm business is
considered to be part of that farm’s net income. As such, it may seem self-evident that
farms with energy production income would have measurably higher net farm income. If
owner-operators are free to refuse unfavorable contracts, it follows that farmers who allow
energy development expect the benefits to outweigh the costs. Previous studies, notably
Weber et al. (2013) and Hitaj et al. (2018), have even quantified the positive impacts of oil
and gas development on farm household income and wealth.
However, the relationship between energy production income and net farm income
may be more ambiguous. The positive impact on wealth observed for farm households
with an energy lease is largely attributable to increased land values rather than to energy
payments per se (Weber et al., 2013; Weber and Hitaj, 2015; Xiarchos, 2017). Focus-
ing on the farm operation’s balance sheet, the positive impact of energy income may be
counteracted if energy production leads to a decrease in the host farm’s agricultural output
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(e.g., by reducing the acreage available for farming, decreasing productivity of surround-
ing land, or encouraging household members to devote less time to farming) or limits
the owner-operator’s access to other sources of on-farm income (e.g., agritourism or non-
energy development). Due to these and related effects, the impact of energy development
on a farm’s net income may be rather less than the sum of royalties and other energy
payments received.
Even if farms with energy leases have higher net farm income, operators would not
necessarily reinvest that income in their farm business. Previous research by Gazheli and
Di Corato (2013) suggests that farmers smooth their spending over time, consistent with
a traditional life-cycle model (Friedman, 1957; Ando and Modigliani, 1963). In a tradi-
tional life-cycle model, the effect of energy production income on capital spending would
probably not be observable. Energy leases make up a very small part of annual household
income for most participating farms, let alone expected lifetime income. However, there
is also evidence that farmers’ marginal propensity to spend income differs depending on
the perceived predictability of the income stream. Farm operators likely practice a de-
gree of context-dependent “mental accounting” as used in behavioral economic models
pioneered by Thaler (1985) and Kahneman and Tversky (2013). This complicates the life-
cycle model. Energy production income seems to be viewed as relatively predictable and,
thus, farm households are more likely to spend income from this source (see Weber et al.
(2013) and Malin and DeMaster (2016)).
Thus, this study uses a hybrid theoretical model of farm consumption developed by
Carriker et al. (1993) and subsequently adapted by Whitaker (2009) and Weber et al.
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(2013). While it is grounded in a life-cycle framework, the model developed by Carriker
et al. uses a system of consumption functions to allow for varying marginal propensity
to consume different streams of income. In the equations below, for a household with k
streams of income, Y represents disposable income, C is income consumed (which, here,
would include capital spending), W is wealth, and t refers to time. The household’s min-
imum possible consumption (regardless of income) is the sum of the β0 terms. The λ
values, which sum to 1 across the system of equations, reflect the proportion of household
consumption from the given income source.
λ1Ct = β01 + β11Yt + β21Ct−1 + β31Wt
λ2Ct = β02 + β12Yt + β22Ct−1 + β32Wt
...
λkCt = β0k + β1kYt + β2kCt−1 + β3kWt
(4.5)
These equations may be combined to produce an estimable function, in which the β1 term
represents the short-term marginal propensity to consume for the income source of interest
(s). For this study, of course, we are only concerned with propensity to consume energy
production income.
Ct =
∑
s−1
λsCt
=
∑
s−1
(β0s + β1sYs + β2sλsCt−1 + β3sWt)
=
∑
s−1
β0s +
∑
s−1
β1sYst +
∑
s−1
β2sλsCt−1 +
∑
s−1
β3sWst
(4.6)
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Finally, Carriker et al. note that long-term marginal propensity to consume income from a
given income stream may be inferred from the above function, accounting for the rate of
consumption growth. Here, g is the annual average consumption growth rate. The average
ratio of wealth to income from source k is given by ω¯.
MPCs =
β1 +
∑
s−1
β3s
∂Wt
∂Yst
1 −
∑
s−1
β2s
(1+g)
≈
β1s +
∑
s−1
β3sω¯
1 −
∑
s−1
β2s
(1+g)
(4.7)
If farmers view energy production income as stable relative to other farm revenue
streams, as suggested by Gazheli and Di Corato (2013), Weber et al. (2013), and Malin and
DeMaster (2016), we would expect farms to have a higher marginal propensity to consume
energy production income than other farm income, including income from agricultural
production or other activities displaced by energy development. Under these conditions,
the Carriker et al. model suggests that farms with energy production income would be
more likely to invest in capital goods. Among farms that made some capital investment
in 2014, the model suggests that, overall, farms with energy income would make larger
investments.
4.4 Theoretical model: impacts of energy income on credit con-
straints
Another financial outcome of interest is credit constraints. Our hypothesis is that farms
with energy production income are less likely to report such constraints.
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Given that there are several mechanisms by which energy production may influence
credit constraints, this study takes a relatively inclusive approach to defining which farms
are credit constrained. TOTAL differentiates between farm respondents who were turned
down for a loan, those who were approved for a smaller loan than requested, and those
who wanted a loan but did not apply because they expected to be turned down. This
study, which uses credit constraints as an outcome variable, considers farmers reporting
any of those circumstances to be similarly credit constrained (1,027 farms in the TOTAL
sample). This aggregation requires us to rely on farmers’ self-reported reasons for not
seeking credit. It is supported by research by Jappelli (1990), Crook (1996), and others
suggesting that would-be borrowers discouraged from seeking credit act similarly to those
actually refused credit.
However, the very existence of credit constraints for farmers requires some explana-
tion. In a perfect capital market, that Utopian vision described in Economics 101 text-
books, credit is governed by simple supply and demand. Interest rates are set through the
costless negotiation of absolutely enforceable contracts between perfectly rational lenders
and borrowers, both with full information. Nobody is denied credit; riskier borrowers are
just subject to higher interest rates and collateral requirements. In practice, alas, lenders
and borrowers must deal with with limited information, burdensome transaction costs,
difficult contract enforcement, adverse selection effects, prejudice, and other credit market
distortions. In this environment, lenders often employ credit rationing: rather than offering
a higher-interest loan, lenders offer smaller loans than requested or refuse credit altogether
to riskier (or structurally disadvantaged) borrowers (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Jappelli,
1990; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992). For a variety of reasons, lenders often behave differently
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toward financially-identical loan applicants; a borrower’s financial characteristics do not
perfectly predict access to credit.
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2012), Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), and Briggeman
et al. (2009) found strong evidence of credit constraints affecting U.S. farm households
(see Section 2.4). We use the credit constraints model developed by Briggeman et al.
(2009), which conceives of binding credit constraints as the result of asymmetry of infor-
mation between lenders and would-be borrowers.
Briggeman et al. begin from the premise that economic actors (here, farm house-
holds) borrow to maximize utility (u) over time. This is consistent with neoclassical
producer-consumer models for agricultural households (Singh et al., 1986; Bezuneh et al.,
1988; Petrick, 2004). In this producer-consumer framework, utility is produced through
a twice-differentiable, quasi-concave function of consumption (c) over time, given exoge-
nous household characteristics (zh). For simplicity, time may be divided into two periods,
0 and 1. In period 0, the household may use liquid (a) or borrowed funds (B) to purchase
variable inputs (x) at price p in order to produce a quantity of economic goods (q). Produc-
tion, revenue generation, repayment of borrowed funds with interest (r), and non-business
activities (N) take place in period 1. Letting zq represent all production inputs, the (con-
cave) production function is q = f (x; zq). As laid out by Briggeman et al., this produces
the following system of equations:
max
c0>0,c1>0,x>0,B≥0
u(c0, c1; zh) (4.8)
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s.t.
a + B − c0 − px = 0 (4.9)
f (x; zq) + N − c1 − (1 + r)B = 0 (4.10)
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) constrain the utility maximization function (4.8) by introducing
budget constraints for periods 0 and 1, respectively. Next, Briggeman et al. introduce a
credit constraint function (which may be binding or non-binding) produced by household
and production characteristics:
B¯(zh, zq) ≥ B (4.11)
Equation (4.11) assumes that, given exogenous interest rates, borrowers may use less credit
than they would like because of information asymmetry between borrower and lender.
With limited ability to identify “bad borrowers,” it may be in lenders’ interests to impose
some form of credit rationing on their customers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Would-be
borrowers, for their part, may overestimate the likelihood of being refused credit.
If the credit constraint is binding (B¯ = B), the optimal solution for equations (4.8)-
(4.10) is:
∂ f (·)
∂x
= p((1 + r) +
η
λ
) (4.12)
The effect of the credit constraint is the addition of η and λ representing the Lagrangean
multipliers produced by, respectively, the credit constraint in period 0 and the budget con-
straint in period 1. In the absence of a credit constraint, we need only inflate p by r to get
the present-value opportunity cost. If, as is logical, the Lagrangean multipliers are posi-
tive, then Briggeman et al. conclude that a credit constrained household must, relative to
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an unconstrained household, have a higher present value opportunity cost, a lower optimal
quantity of inputs purchased (x) and, therefore, lower production (q).
Adapting the above model for our study, we expect that energy production income re-
lieves credit constraints for participating farmers in several ways. Most obviously, farmers
can use lease income and royalties in lieu of loans to finance operations or improvements
(an increase in a that, all else being equal, would diminish B). In addition, a farmer with an
energy lease may be in a stronger position to obtain credit if the lease increases the value
of farm assets that he/she can leverage (a change to zh increasing B¯). Finally, it is possible
that energy lease income has a psychological effect: participating farmers may be more
likely to apply for credit when needed if energy assets increase the perceived likelihood
that their credit application will be approved (a change to zh with a non-negative effect on
B¯). Under this framework, we hypothesize a that energy production income will decrease
self-reported capital constraints.
4.5 Empirical model: propensity score matching
In experimental research, subjects are typically randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups. This ensures that the treatment and control groups are statistically equivalent:
identical in all respects other than the parameter of interest. In such circumstances, the
observed average treatment effect (ATE) of an intervention is equivalent to the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Given a binary treatment variable t, this may be
summarized as:
AT E = ATT = E(∆) = E(Yt=1 − Yt=0) (4.13)
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In non-experimental studies, assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups is
rarely truly random. In this study, for instance, there are systematic differences in the
characteristics of farms that do and do not choose to host energy projects. A useful way to
illustrate this point is to simply compare key characteristics of farms with and without an
energy lease. Limiting the sample to farms in energy-producing counties or commercial-
scale operations reduces the differences but does not eliminate them.
Clearly, the impact of energy development cannot be inferred by simply comparing
outcomes for participating and non-participating farms; there is selection bias. Instead,
estimating the ATT requires comparing the observed outcome for participating farms with
its counterfactual: the outcome for those farms in the absence of an energy lease.
ATT = E(Yt=1|t = 1) − E(Yt=0|t = 1) (4.14)
This creates a conundrum for the researcher, often called “the fundamental problem of
causal inference”: it is impossible to observe the outcome of treatment and non-treatment
for any single subject. A common response to this problem is the assumption of unit
homogeneity. That is, an individual outcome is a function of treatment and the uniform
effects (even if unobserved) of that individual’s characteristics (Holland, 1986). Under
this assumption, an untreated subject is a valid counterfactual of a treated subject if the
only relevant difference between the two is the treatment itself (Rubin, 1974). Matching
techniques address the selection bias problem by pairing each treated research subject
with one or more subjects from the comparison group with similar (relevant) pre-treatment
characteristics. Matching becomes exponentially more difficult, however, as one considers
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Table 4.9: Mean characteristics of farms in TOTAL sample with and without
an energy lease
All farms Energy counties1 Commercial farms
lease no lease lease no lease lease no lease
Acres operated 2130 881 2190 975 3940 1760
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk tolerance2 5.60 5.34 5.54 5.37 6.40 6.12
p-value (0.000) (0.026) (0.003)
% college grads3 33.0% 28.0% 32.9% 29.6% 35.2% 28.6%
p-value (0.000) (0.014) (0.001)
Hours worked/yr4 2220 2020 2200 2010 2840 2800
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.426)
Years experience5 34.0 29.5 34.0 29.2 33.9 30.3
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Three significant digits, two-sided p-value of difference in means in parentheses
(1) Farms located in counties with significant oil, gas, solar, or wind production
(2) Operator willingness to take risks (self-reported on a 0 to 10 scale)
(3) Percent of principal operators in specified group with a 4-year college degree
(4) Total hours worked on the farm by the principal operator
(5) Years that the principal has operated ANY farm
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additional relevant characteristics. Richard Bellman’s infamous “curse of dimensionality”
(Bellman and Kalaba, 1959) makes direct matching a practical impossibility for all but the
simplest economic models .
The crucial innovation of propensity score matching, first described in Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983), was to match subjects on the probability of a given subject being in the
treatment group. The “propensity score” itself may be estimated from a vector of observed
variables that predict participation or non-participation in the treatment or program of
interest. Conditional on the propensity score, treatment assignment is strongly ignorable:
subjects are equally likely to be in the treatment or comparison group. The ATT estimator
is the mean difference in outcomes between treated and untreated subjects, weighted by
the probability of those subjects being in the treatment group.
ATTPS M = EP(X)|t=1[E(Yt=1|t = 1, P(X)) − E(Yt=0|t = 0, P(X))] (4.15)
Propensity score matching offers several compelling advantages over other non-
experimental methods. If properly executed, the technique can balance treatment and
control groups on a large number of covariates without sacrificing a large number of ob-
servations (Olmos and Govindasamy, 2015). It is not unusual for researchers to take hun-
dreds of covariates into account when calculating propensity score (Garrido et al., 2014).
Propensity score matching also has the advantage of reducing data, converting many fine
measures to a single coarse measure of similarity (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). If the
goal is to calculate ATT, propensity score matching operates well when treatment is rare
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Overfitting does not introduce bias or inconsistency, as
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the model for propensity score estimation is intended to describe existing data rather than
to generalize for other data (Sainani, 2012)3. Thus, a propensity score model may consider
a large number of covariates compared to, for instance, a straightforward OLS regression.
Due to these advantages, propensity score matching and its variants have proved pop-
ular for a wide range of research questions. Agricultural economists have used propensity
score matching to address subjects as diverse as the impact of agricultural technology
adoption on poverty (Mendola, 2007), the effectiveness of easement purchases for farm-
land preservation (Liu and Lynch, 2011), and comparing the productivity and technical
efficiency of organic and conventional dairy farms (Mayen et al., 2010)
However, propensity score matching also requires two key assumptions. First, propen-
sity score matching depends upon common support: all subjects must have a probability of
being part of the treatment group between 0 and 1 (Heinrich et al., 2010). Simply put, there
is no basis for a comparison if a subject with particular characteristics is never or always
treated. This is also known as the overlap condition (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Second, propensity score matching requires selection on observables: the propensity
score must reflect all characteristics relevant to determining treatment status, including
those that simultaneously affect treatment status and outcomes4. Omitted variables can sig-
nificantly distort propensity score matching models, as shown by Smith and Todd (2005),
3Extraneous covariates can increase the variance of propensity scores and reduce the region of common
support (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This risk is reduced, though not eliminated, by our large sample
size.
4In some papers, this is called unconfoundedness or the conditional independence assumption, referring
to the fact that potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment conditional upon the vector of
observed covariates.
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Agodini and Dynarski (2004), Heckman et al. (1998), among others. Problems frequently
arise with data sets that contain few independent variables, few observations, independent
variables compiled from multiple sources, or treatment and control groups that differ in
geography, time, or data-gathering process (Smith and Todd, 2005). In contrast, the large,
detailed ARMS data set used for this study is exceptionally well-suited to a “data-hungry”
propensity score matching approach. A series of balancing tests (described in more detail
below) confirms that, conditional upon the propensity score, farms operators in our study
were equally likely to be in the treated or untreated group.
4.5.1 Selecting covariates
Our propensity score matching model used all of the covariates identified for the logistic
regression model (see section 4.2.2), with some additions described in Table 4.10. As
noted above, propensity score matching models are vulnerable to omitted variable bias
(hence the selection on observables assumption), but are tolerant of overfitting. Extraneous
variables do not introduce bias or inconsistency, though they can increase the variance of
propensity scores and reduce the region of common support in smaller samples (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008). Here, again, the large TOTAL sample offers some protection.
That said, the selection on observables assumption is an important limitation of this
model. Despite the large data set and encouraging results from model diagnostic tests (see
below), there is always some risk that the model is missing a key driver of energy leasing.
For example, we could not include covariates directly reflecting the beliefs and motivations
of a given farm operator, the agricultural value of land leased for energy development, or
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Table 4.10: Covariates omitted from predictive model included for propensity
score estimation
ERS region Location in one of nine ERS-designated production regions
Household net worth Total assets of household members, farm and non-farm
Large-scale solar County contained at least one megawatt-scale solar facility by end of
2014
Large-scale wind County contained at least one MW of large-scale wind capacity by
end of 2014
Metro county Census-designated metro county
Non-metro recreation area Non-metro county with significant recreation assets, designated by
the U.S. Census
Plans to sell land Operator plans to sell land within the next three years
Retired Principal operator is currently retired
Shale county Percent of host county located over an oil- or gas-bearing shale
formation
Share-based rent Percent of acres operated that is rented from another landowner solely
in exchange for a share of production
State solar generation Net generation from solar in 2014, adjusted for state area
Transfer to relative Plan to sell or transfer farmland to a relative within the next five years
Transmission density High-voltage transmission lines in host county per square mile, com-
pared to other U.S. counties (expressed as a percentile)
the impact of relatively permissive or restrictive local governments. Each of these could
impact an owner-operator’s response to energy development opportunities in ways not
fully captured by other covariates.
4.5.2 Propensity score estimation model
Logit, probit, and linear probability models are commonly used to estimate propensity
scores with a binary treatment (here, whether a given farm reported receiving royalty or
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lease income from energy production in 2014). The functional form of the linear proba-
bility model is ill-suited to predicting a highly-skewed treatment variable (there are many
more untreated than treated subjects) and that model also produces propensity scores out-
side of the logical bounds (0 to 1) (Smith, 1997). It may be rejected. Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC) suggests that the difference between logit (AIC value of 9365) and probit
(AIC value of 9366) models is negligible; we opted for a logit estimation model.
For continuous covariates, we added fractional polynomials to the estimation model to
compensate for nonlinear relationships. This portion of the model was based on a closed
test procedure using α = 0.05. A model incorporating fractional polynomials offers a
significantly better fit to the data. The AIC value of the non-polynomial base specification
is 9142; AIC for the model with polynomials is 8712.
4.5.3 Matching algorithm
Researchers have proposed many matching algorithms to compare treated and untreated
subjects in propensity score matching models. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) used a “near-
est neighbor” approach pairing each treated subject to the most similar untreated counter-
part in the sample, without replacement. Later widely-used propensity score matching
variants imposed calipers restricting nearest neighbor matching (Austin, 2011), compared
each treated observation to all untreated observations with a propensity score within a
given radius (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), partitioned the region of common support into
strata (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999), or used a kernel-weighted average of multiple untreated
observations to construct a match for treated individuals (Heckman et al., 1997). None of
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these approaches consistently outperform the others (hence the survival of such diversity
in matching algorithms); the best approach depends on the structure of underlying data.
The results of different propensity score matching algorithms tend to converge as sam-
ple size increases and the average quality of matches improves (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008).
4.5.4 Balancing tests
To identify the best matching algorithm for this study, we used a series of balance tests
on three promising matching algorithms: nearest neighbor (without replacement), radius
matching5, and Epanechnikov kernel weighting. Nearest neighbor with replacement, strat-
ification and Gaussian kernel weighting were also tested and rejected. The tables below
highlight results for ten covariates hypothesized to be important predictors of energy leas-
ing.
Table 4.11 uses t-tests to compare mean values of covariates for farms that did and did
not report income from an energy lease. The table shows two values for each covariate: the
t-score6 and the estimated percent bias for that covariate. For each test, the null hypothesis
is that, controlling for the propensity score, there is no difference in means between the
treated and untreated group. Results highlighted in red are statistically significant at the
α = 0.05 level, suggesting that the researcher may reject the null hypothesis in favor of an
5We used a radius equal to 20% of the propensity score standard deviation, following Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985).
6The t-score represents the difference between the covariate’s mean value in the the treated and untreated
groups in terms of standard errors. T-scores over 1.96 are statistically significant at the α = .05 level. In
other words, 5% of samples drawn from balanced groups should produce a t-score greater than 1.96
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alternative hypothesis that there is a significant difference in means.
It is immediately apparent that the raw data is unbalanced. Nine of the ten illustrative
variables demonstrate statistically-significant differences between treated and untreated
farms. Seven of the covariates are biased more than 10% between the treated and untreated
groups. Treated farms were more than twice as likely to be located in an oil- or gas-
producing county than untreated farms.
Figure 4.2: Reduction of bias with nearest neighbor
matching
All three of the match-
ing algorithms greatly
decrease bias relative to
the unmatched sample.
However, it is worth
noting that the kernel-
weighted technique still
shows a significant dif-
ference between treated
and untreated farms’ like-
lihood of being in an
oil/gas producing county.
Since that variable is a strong predictor of energy lease participation, this result is of some
concern. Using the nearest neighbor and radius/caliper matching algorithms, we may re-
ject the null hypothesis for all ten illustrative variables.
In addition to differences in means, it is important to consider differing variance across
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matching algorithms. Matching methods face a trade-off between bias and variance. With
large samples such as the TOTAL data set, however, there is often no practical difference
in variance between methods (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Table 4.12: Rubin’s ratio of variance (covariates orthogonal to the propensity
score)
Selected covariates Unmatched Nearest Radius Epanechnikov
neighbor kernel
Acres owned 0.23 1.12 0.72 0.60
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.71 0.91 0.92 0.90
Annual hours worked on farm by principal operator 2.78 1.01 1.02 1.05
Percent of county over an oil- or gas-bearing shale formation 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.95
High off-farm income (highest quartile in sample) 1.37 1.09 1.07 1.08
Located in an oil- or gas-producing county 0.64 0.98 0.92 0.91
Percent of land operated that is rented from another landowner 0.81 0.90 0.91 0.90
High-production farm (highest quartile in sample) 1.04 0.96 0.97 0.99
Average county solar irradiation (percentile among U.S. counties) 1.45 0.98 1.05 1.04
County contains “good” or better wind resources 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00
Table 4.12 uses a variance diagnostic table proposed by Rubin (2001). The values
listed reflect the ratio of variance for the treated group to the variance for the matched
untreated group in the covariates orthogonal to the propensity score. The ratio should close
to 1.0 in a balanced sample. As proposed by Rubin, ratios less than 0.8 or greater than 1.2
are cause for concern. Though less pronounced than in Table 4.11, the unmatched sample
has clear signs of imbalance, and all three matching algorithms are clear improvements.
The nearest neighbor method performs particularly well, with no ratios more than 0.11
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from the ideal 1.0.
Finally, Table 4.13 summarizes five joint balancing tests for the matching algorithms
tested. The likelihood ratio χ2 tests the null hypothesis that, controlling for the propen-
sity score, there is no difference in covariate values between the treated and untreated
farm groups. The mean and median standardized bias scores summarize imbalance be-
tween treated and untreated mean values across all covariates. The ratio of variances is
an extension of Rubin’s diagnostic described above, summarizing differences in variances
across all covariates for treated and untreated farms. Though appealing for their simplicity,
joint tests should be considered in conjunction with the variable-by-variable balance tests
above; aggregation can conceal problems with important predictors.
Table 4.13: Joint balancing tests
Selected covariates Unmatched Nearest
Neighbor
Radius Epanechnikov
kernel
Likelihood Ratio χ2 3672.2 84.9 37.0 71.0
Mean standardized bias 22.4 2.7 1.8 2.7
Median standardized bias 14.2 2.3 1.5 2.3
Ratio of variances 0.83 0.95 0.60 0.40
Balance tests of individual covariates and of overall differences in means suggest that
the propensity score is a consistent estimate of the (unobservable) true likelihood of a
farm receiving energy lease income. Differences in means and variance are minor and
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manageable. For this study, we opted to continue with the nearest neighbor matching
algorithm. For our underlying data, this simple technique offers the best balance of low
bias and constant variance between treatment and control groups.
4.5.5 Region of common support
As might be expected, the distribution of propensity scores is very different for participat-
ing and non-participating farms.
For our purposes, propensity score matching is only effective if each participating farm
can be paired with a non-participating farm that is otherwise very similar. There is no basis
for a meaningful comparison if a given farm has a set of characteristics that are always or
never associated with energy development.
A common, intuitively appealing approach to defining the region of common support is
to simply exclude all treated observations with a propensity score larger than the maximum
untreated propensity score and to exclude all untreated observations with a score smaller
than the minimum treated propensity score. (See, for instance, Lechner (2002).) We
compared the region of common support defined by this approach to those created using
two popular alternatives. Cole and Herna´n (2008) and Lunt (2014) recommend excluding
all subjects with propensity scores in the xth centile of untreated or 100 − xth centile of
treated groups. Smith and Todd (2005) proposed excluding regions within the distribution
with very low density of treated or untreated observations. Balance tests (summarized in
Table 4.14) suggest that the Lechner (2002) approach offers the lowest observed difference
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Table 4.14: Methods of defining the region of common support
Treatment: farm received income from an energy lease in 2014
Method Min. prop. Max prop. Percent Treated Balance
score score omitted observations test1
No trimming 0 .8868 - 1550 1.8
Minima/maxima2 .0002 .7817 0.2% 1550 1.6
Centile-based3 .0069 .3828 29.8% 1244 1.9
Density-based4 2.284e−7 .7907 0.2% 1545 1.8
NOTES: (1) Values in this column represent the median bias in standardized mean values of covari-
ates for treated vs. untreated farms, across all covariates. These estimates used a nearest neighbor
matching algorithm, with replacement.
(2) Region of common support defined as the observations with a propensity score greater than
the lowest propensity score in the treated group and less than the largest propensity score in the
untreated group.
(3) Excludes untreated observations with a propensity score in the 1st centile and treated observa-
tions in the 99th centile of propensity scores
(4) Excludes observations with a propensity score more than 0.25 standard deviations of the propen-
sity score from the closest potential match (0.023).
in covariate means, controlling for propensity score, between farms that did and did not
receive energy lease payments in 2014.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS: CHARACTERISTICS OF FARMS PARTICIPATING IN ENERGY
LEASING
The following chapter lays out the results from the predictive logistic model described
in section 4.2. For ease of reading and comparison, we have grouped covariates into
four broad categories: farm business attributes, operator and household attributes, energy
resources, and farm location variables (i.e., socioeconomic surroundings).
In the first section below, we look at correlation between covariates and energy pro-
duction income using the full data set (with clustered errors and population weights as
previously described) and three related dependent variables. The dependent variable in the
base specification (column 1) simply reflects whether a farm reported any income from
energy production in 2014. Two variations on that specification focus on energy payments
that are “substantial” in either relative or absolute terms. Column 2 limits the treatment
group to farms that received at least 50% of their 2014 net farm income from energy pro-
duction. The dependent variable for column 3 is whether a farm received at least $10,000
in energy payments. In section 5.2, we repeat our analysis while omitting farms classi-
fied by the USDA as “residence” operations. The remaining subsample (intermediate and
commercial farms in the USDA typology) includes only owner-operators who consider
farming to be their primary occupation. Subsection 5.3 compares farm attributes that are
associated with participation in an oil or gas lease (of any size) to those associated with
other kinds of leases. This analysis uses the full TOTAL sample.
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We list the results in terms of the p-score and the average marginal effect on the odds
ratio for each independent variable. Results highlighted in green are significant at the
α = .05 level. The results in this section reflect correlation rather than causation. Where
appropriate, we discuss mechanisms that could explain a given result; however, additional
study would be necessary to confirm causal relationships.
5.1 All farms: predictors of receiving energy royalties
5.1.1 Farm business variables
Farm size matters across all three specifications. There is a consistent, positive relationship
between the number of acres owned by a given farmer and his/her likelihood of reporting
energy production income1. This is consistent with the findings of Sutherland and Hol-
stead (2014) on wind development, but not with the conclusions of Beckman and Xiarchos
(2013) on predictors of commercial-scale solar and Malin and DeMaster (2016) regarding
predictors of gas leases in the Marcellus shale2. There may a similar, positive relationship
between energy income and farmer tenure, as found by Xiarchos and Lazarus (2013) for
solar adoption as well as Claassen and Morehart (2009) and Soule et al. (2000) for CRP
participation. Farms with lower ratios of land rented to land operated seem more likely
to report energy production payments over $10,000, and results are near-significant in the
1It seems more likely that greater owned acreage influences likelihood of energy income rather than
vice versa. In a separate regression, we replaced the “acres owned” covariate with a covariate reflecting
whether the given operation had recently purchased land. We found no evidence of a correlation between
energy income and recent farmland purchases, as one would expect if energy development triggered major
consolidation in the agriculture (found by Hoy et al. (2018) and Xiarchos (2017)).
2This is not necessarily a contradiction; most previous studies focused on a specific type of energy
production in a particular area, whereas this thesis is concerned with all energy production on U.S. farmland.
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Table 5.1: Results of predictive model: farm business variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Farm debt: more than $250,000 1.395*** 0.007 1.113 0.613 1.471*** 0.004
Debt to asset ratio 0.610*** 0.008 0.809 0.222 0.534*** 0.006
Acres owned, in 100s 1.002** 0.011 1.002*** 0.000 1.001*** 0.008
Conservation payments to farm in 2014 1.370** 0.030 1.074 0.696 1.105 0.605
Percent of acres operated rented from another landowner 0.997* 0.088 0.995* 0.081 0.990*** 0.000
Farm specialty: grains or oilseeds 1.328 0.228 1.953** 0.027 1.528 0.124
Value of farm production: lowest quartile 0.846 0.334 0.550*** 0.009 1.130 0.653
Farm debt: less than $1000 0.852 0.365 0.696 0.169 0.518** 0.013
Fixed farm costs less than $5000 (approx. lowest quartile) 0.847 0.515 0.873 0.701 1.054 0.900
Value of farm production: highest quartile 0.871 0.544 1.386 0.204 1.027 0.924
Farm specialty: livestock or animal products 1.032 0.819 1.039 0.791 1.038 0.849
Production or marketing contract in place 0.975 0.873 0.435*** 0.000 0.574** 0.013
Fixed farm costs ≥ $50,000 (approx. highest quartile) 1.018 0.898 1.158 0.396 0.958 0.833
Farm specialty: fruit or vegetables 1.029 0.911 0.694 0.243 0.556** 0.030
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
other two specifications.
There is also a significant relationship between energy income and farm debt (as sug-
gested by Malin and DeMaster (2016)), though the direction of causality is unclear. In two
of three specifications, farms with lower debt relative to assets are significantly more likely
to report energy production income. High nominal farm debt, though, also appears to be
positively correlated with energy income. Farms with more than $250,000 in outstand-
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ing debt (approximately the highest quartile for farms in TOTAL) were significantly more
likely to report energy income. There is weak evidence of the opposite relationship with
low-debt farms. In TOTAL, farm assets would include energy and other non-agricultural
assets on land owned by a farm business. Farms with known or suspected energy resources,
therefore, would be expected to have greater assets than otherwise comparable operations.
This, in turn, would produce a lower debt-to-asset ratio if farms with an energy lease did
not leverage their energy resources to the extent of their other assets. However, it is also
plausible that farms with less burdensome debt are in a better position to take advantage of
development opportunities, and that the correlation with high absolute debt reflects a more
fundamental relationship between farm businesses size (or financial sophistication). The
non-significant results in Table 5.1 are just as striking. We found no evidence of a relation-
ship between energy leasing and fixed farm costs and very little evidence of a correlation
with the value of farm production.
5.1.2 Farm operator and household variables
Since gross farm income in the TOTAL survey includes income from energy production,
it is not surprising that farms with a negative net effect on household finances are also less
likely to report energy income. However, farms contributing a large share of household in-
come may also be less likely to have energy income (this negative correlation is significant
in base specification and strongly suggestive in $10,000 case).
It is noteworthy that energy income is strongly associated with high non-farm house-
hold assets and with high off-farm household income. The effect seems to be stronger
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Table 5.2: Results of predictive model: farm operator and household vari-
ables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Non-farm household assets total ≥ $1 million 1.740*** 0.000 1.848*** 0.000 2.505*** 0.000
Ratio of net farm to total household income: NEGATIVE 0.354*** 0.000 0.360*** 0.000 0.113*** 0.000
Ratio of net farm to total household income: NO RESPONSE 0.145*** 0.000 0.169*** 0.002 0.203*** 0.002
Off-farm household income at least $100,000 in 2013 1.606*** 0.000 1.858*** 0.000 2.024*** 0.000
Farmer experience: more than 10 years 1.489*** 0.003 1.290 0.151 1.279 0.417
Ratio of net farm to total household income: HIGH 0.732** 0.026 0.852 0.343 0.644* 0.051
Non-farm debt: high 0.754** 0.038 0.674* 0.089 1.035 0.907
Retirement: plans to retire within 3 years 1.199* 0.077 1.226* 0.095 1.385 0.152
Off-farm household income NEGATIVE in 2013 1.225 0.161 1.524* 0.059 1.195 0.464
Farmer experience: less than 5 years 0.593 0.184 0.468 0.165 0.355** 0.012
Principal operator or spouse graduated 4-year college 1.123 0.222 1.153 0.315 1.227 0.166
Farmer experience: NO RESPONSE 0.681 0.227 0.762 0.492 0.475* 0.094
Female farmer 0.839 0.426 0.897 0.706 1.027 0.862
Risk tolerance: high 1.112 0.450 1.248 0.105 1.084 0.766
Retirement: NO RESPONSE 0.816 0.546 0.642 0.255 0.709 0.462
Principal operator annual hours worked on farm (1000s) 0.979 0.627 0.966 0.612 0.939 0.428
RIsk tolerance: NO RESPONSE 0.902 0.705 0.964 0.924 0.960 0.923
Principal operator has a dwelling on farm operation 0.966 0.752 0.681** 0.038 1.077 0.665
Non-farm debt: none 0.977 0.854 0.996 0.982 1.827*** 0.001
Age of primary operator 0.999 0.917 0.997 0.736 0.991 0.441
Non-farm household assets total less than $50,000 1.002 0.988 1.139 0.615 0.886 0.738
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
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for farms that depend on energy income and for those receiving large energy payments.
Households with greater or more diversified assets may be better able to take advantage
of development opportunities. Alternatively, households may be investing energy lease
income in non-farm assets at the same time that loss of farmed acres to energy production
encourages household members to devote more time to off-farm work.
Finally, it is worth highlighting several variables that were not significant in these
three specifications. In the full sample, we found no evidence of a relationship between
the likelihood of receiving energy production income and an operator’s age, education3,
gender, or self-reported risk tolerance. Despite the significant correlation with high off-
farm income and assets noted above, we found no corresponding relationship for farms
with relatively low off-farm income and assets. Farmers with an energy lease were no
more or less likely to report near-term plans for retirement and, perhaps most importantly,
did not work significantly fewer hours on their farm. These final (non-) results are not
consistent with a hypothesis that energy leases provide an incentive for farmers to exit the
industry.
5.1.3 Energy resource variables
Unsurprisingly, state and county energy resource endowments are strong predictors of
farm energy income. Overall, there is a clear link between area oil and gas production and
the likelihood of a farm having energy production income. The same effect is visible for
3Education is strongly significant for intermediate- and commercial-type farms, as will be discussed in
Section 5.2.
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Table 5.3: Results of predictive model: energy resource variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
State natural gas production, MMcf produced per square mile 1.026*** 0.000 1.029*** 0.000 1.035*** 0.000
Natural gas produced in county, 2011 (million cubic feet) 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000
State solar net generation, MWh per square mile 0.967*** 0.000 0.969*** 0.010 1.001 0.959
Crude oil produced in county in 2011 (1000s of barrels) 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.003 1.000*** 0.000
Change in county oil production (1000s barrels), 2000 to 2011 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.001 1.000*** 0.000
Relative county solar resource (percentile of U.S. counties) 1.014** 0.011 1.011** 0.048 1.020*** 0.001
County contains ”good” or better wind resources 0.768* 0.073 0.692** 0.016 0.852 0.317
State wind net generation, MWh per square mile 1.002 0.129 1.002 0.140 1.002 0.154
State crude oil production, barrels produced per square mile 1.000 0.209 1.000 0.129 1.000*** 0.009
Change in county gas production (million cubic feet), 2000 to 2011 0.999 0.449 0.999* 0.087 0.999 0.353
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
farms in counties with better solar resources (measured by annual average insolation) and,
perhaps, for farms in counties with better wind resources. Clearly, location is important!
However, there are some counterintuitive results in this table.
There is no clear relationship between state wind electricity production (adjusted for
state area) and the likelihood of energy income for farms. This may be due to the fact
that wind development is still much less common than oil or gas drilling. As of July
2018, the U.S. Wind Turbine Database recorded 57,646 wind turbines in the United States
(Hoen et al., 2018). In 2016,the most recent year for which statistics are available, the
EIA reported 1,010,441 active oil and gas wells (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
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2017).
There is also no correlation between energy production income and increasing county
gas production from 2000 though 2011 (the most recent year for which county-level gas
production data is available). This is likely due the changing geography of U.S. gas pro-
duction from 2011 to 2014, when ERS collected data for TOTAL. Shale gas production
increased by 68% over those three years (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018a),
so areas of gas production on farmland in 2014 would be somewhat different than areas
of oil production in 2011. Furthermore, landowners may be more likely to retain mineral
rights for land over unconventional oil and and gas deposits compared to areas with a long
history of conventional oil and gas development (Weber and Hitaj, 2015).
Finally, it is striking that farms in states with more solar generation have significantly
lower likelihood of reporting energy income. This may reflect a tougher regulatory and
policy environment for oil and gas development in states that have prioritized solar devel-
opment.
5.1.4 Socioeconomic surroundings
After controlling for partisanship, race, and income, there is no obvious correlation be-
tween county population density and the likelihood of energy development. Instead, we
observed a negative correlation between median county income and receiving energy pay-
ments. Farms in more liberal counties also show lower odds ratios than would otherwise
be expected. Taken together, these may suggest that wealthier or more liberal areas may
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Table 5.4: Results of predictive model: farm location variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Cents that state avg retail electricity rate is above or below U.S.
avg
1.535*** 0.000 1.546*** 0.001 0.781 0.384
Cents that state avg retail natural gas rate is above or below U.S.
avg
0.734*** 0.000 0.765*** 0.002 0.888 0.192
County vote for Clinton in 2016 presidential election (%) 0.091*** 0.000 0.045*** 0.000 0.253** 0.049
Median county household income ($1000s) 0.980** 0.013 0.978** 0.021 0.976*** 0.000
County population density 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.387 0.999 0.419
More than 800 internet connections per 1000 households in
county by end of 2014
1.179 0.305 1.273 0.300 0.911 0.668
County: percent of population self-identified as ”white” 0.997 0.764 0.996 0.660 1.021** 0.019
Fewer than 400 internet connections per 1000 county house-
holds by end of 2014
0.945 0.860 0.845 0.594 1.330 0.517
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
be less willing to accept nearby energy development–or, rather, the negative externalities
that come with it.
At the state level, higher average electricity prices are associated with higher odds of
receiving energy income (consistent with Xiarchos and Lazarus (2013) findings on renew-
able energy adoption) while the reverse is true with average natural gas prices, possibly
because natural gas prices are simply lower in production areas. If, however, we impose
the $10,000 threshold for substantial energy income, neither electricity nor natural gas
prices are significant predictors.
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Table 5.5: Intermediate and commercial farms: farm business variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Farm debt: more than $250,000 1.586*** 0.000 1.522** 0.028 1.452*** 0.009
Acres owned, in 100s 1.002*** 0.001 1.002*** 0.001 1.001*** 0.004
Debt to asset ratio 0.565*** 0.001 0.588** 0.021 0.509* 0.079
Value of farm production: highest quartile 0.684** 0.010 0.518** 0.021 1.105 0.631
Farm debt: less than $1000 0.539* 0.051 0.417** 0.049 0.387** 0.018
Value of farm production: lowest quartile 1.411 0.187 2.562*** 0.003 1.731** 0.049
Percent of acres operated rented from another landowner 0.997 0.190 0.995** 0.026 0.991*** 0.000
Principal operator annual hours worked on farm (1000s) 0.947 0.196 0.916 0.174 0.896 0.161
Conservation payments to farm in 2014 1.164 0.279 1.035 0.824 1.012 0.907
Farm specialty: livestock or animal products 0.823 0.306 0.759 0.268 0.800 0.365
Farm specialty: grains or oilseeds 1.223 0.404 1.717* 0.074 1.274 0.348
Fixed farm costs ≥ $100,000 (approx. highest quartile) 1.175 0.662 1.656 0.265 1.660 0.170
Production or marketing contract in place 1.042 0.764 0.533*** 0.003 0.622** 0.012
Farm specialty: fruit or vegetables 1.133 0.783 0.989 0.982 0.280** 0.017
Fixed farm costs less than $10,000 (approx. lowest quartile) 1.022 0.873 1.573*** 0.005 1.114 0.613
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
5.2 Intermediate- and commercial-scale farms
On their own, it’s tempting to ascribe some of the effects observed in the full sample
to differences between residence-type operations (a large majority of U.S. farms) and
intermediate- or commercial-type operations (a large majority of U.S. agricultural produc-
tion by value). To pick one example, farm debt is strongly correlated with an operations
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Table 5.6: Intermediate and commercial farms: operator and household vari-
ables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Ratio of net farm to total household income: NEGATIVE 0.445*** 0.000 0.588* 0.056 0.231*** 0.000
Principal operator or spouse graduated 4-year college 1.421*** 0.000 1.531** 0.023 1.541*** 0.001
Ratio of net farm to total household income: NO RESPONSE 0.157*** 0.002 0.262** 0.042 0.205** 0.013
Off-farm household income at least $100,000 in 2013 1.565*** 0.007 2.339*** 0.000 2.230*** 0.001
Farmer experience: more than 10 years 1.612** 0.028 1.509* 0.053 1.335 0.187
Non-farm household assets total ≥ $1 million 1.637** 0.038 1.233 0.258 1.892*** 0.000
Non-farm household assets total less than $50,000 1.361** 0.050 1.566* 0.060 1.016 0.953
Female farmer 0.540 0.114 0.619 0.312 0.483** 0.047
Farmer experience: NO RESPONSE 0.482 0.173 0.447 0.238 0.496 0.258
Farmer experience: less than 5 years 0.512 0.198 0.245* 0.075 0.352 0.197
Non-farm debt: none 1.176 0.264 1.231 0.272 1.665*** 0.001
Retirement: plans to retire within 3 years 1.219 0.288 1.479 0.127 1.083 0.683
Ratio of net farm to total household income: HIGH 0.870 0.327 1.239 0.300 0.898 0.548
Non-farm debt: high 0.855 0.524 0.714 0.351 1.474 0.207
Principal operator has a dwelling on farm operation 1.071 0.619 0.897 0.622 1.423* 0.099
Retirement: NO RESPONSE 1.210 0.652 0.874 0.817 0.574 0.420
Off-farm household income NEGATIVE in 2013 0.919 0.664 1.248 0.300 0.595 0.153
Age of primary operator 0.996 0.670 0.984 0.239 0.985 0.175
Risk tolerance: NO RESPONSE 0.877 0.738 0.629 0.295 1.017 0.976
Risk tolerance: HIGH 0.996 0.986 0.743** 0.017 1.084 0.799
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
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scale of production: 65% of the farms in the low debt group are residence operations; 80%
of those in the high debt group are commercial in the USDA typology. Even after control-
ling for related covariates like acres operated, value of production, fixed farm costs, and
so forth, results from the full sample could be biased if there are fundamental differences
in behavior between part-time and full-time farmers.
In this context, it is important to note that the results for intermediate- and commercial-
type farms are very similar to those in the full sample. Nearly all of the covariates that were
significant in the full sample were also predictors in this sub-sample: farm acreage, farm
debt, contract arrangements, negative farm contribution to household income, non-farm
assets, off-farm income, energy resources, county income, and partisanship. Moreover,
none of the results from the intermediate- and commercial-type farms contradict those of
the full model: no significant covariates “switch signs” between models; positive correla-
tions in one sample are also positive in the other4.
However, there are some illuminating differences. The relationship between energy
income and the value of farm production is much more significant for intermediate and
commercial farmers than in the full sample. Interestingly, being in either the lowest or
the highest quartile of farm production (within the restricted sample) is associated with a
lower likelihood of reporting energy lease income.
Farms with low non-farm household assets also show an elevated likelihood of report-
ing energy income, a relationship that is not at all apparent in the full sample. This likely
4There is one exception among near-significant covariates, the relationship between higher education and
energy leasing is positive and significant in the large-farm base specification, but negative in the full sample
base specification (with a p-value of 0.184).
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Table 5.7: Intermediate and commercial farms: energy resource variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
Natural gas produced in county, 2011 (million cubic feet) 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000
State natural gas production, MMcf produced per square mile 1.019*** 0.000 1.023*** 0.000 1.024*** 0.000
Change in county oil production (1000s barrels), 2000 to 2011 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000 1.000*** 0.000
State solar net generation, MWh per square mile 0.976*** 0.000 0.980* 0.066 1.000 0.995
County oil production (1000s barrels), 2011 1.000*** 0.004 1.000** 0.018 1.000*** 0.000
State wind net generation, MWh per square mile 1.003*** 0.009 1.002 0.216 1.002* 0.058
State crude oil production, barrels produced per square mile 1.000* 0.060 1.000** 0.035 1.000** 0.013
Relative county solar resource (percentile of U.S. counties) 1.008 0.151 1.008 0.255 1.013** 0.038
County contains ”good” or better wind resources 0.858 0.236 0.733* 0.094 1.146 0.323
Change in county natural gas production (million cubic feet), 2000
to 2011
1.000 0.859 0.997** 0.017 0.998 0.407
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
reflects a difference in the relationship between non-farm assets and household net worth
for residence farm operators compared to intermediate and commercial farm operators5
Residence farm households with low non-farm assets are very likely to have low house-
hold net worth as well: for residence farms in the total sample, the correlation between
non-farm assets and household net worth is .794. Larger farms with low non-farm assets
may simply have concentrated their assets in the farm business. For intermediate and com-
mercial farms in our sample, the correlation between non-farm assets and household net
5In the USDA typology, the defining characteristic of a residence operation (along with gross produc-
tion under $350,000) is that the farm’s operator does not consider farming to be his/her principal occupa-
tion. Farming is the principal occupation for operators of intermediate farms and for nearly all operators of
commercial-type farms.
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Table 5.8: Intermediate and commercial farms: farm location variables
Base (1) 50% NFI (2) $10K threshold (3)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
County vote for Clinton in 2016 presidential election (%) 0.009*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 0.030*** 0.000
Cents that state avg retail electricity rate is above or below U.S.
avg
1.450*** 0.000 1.303 0.155 0.898 0.701
Cents that state avg retail natural gas rate is above or below U.S.
avg
0.782*** 0.001 0.863* 0.057 0.909 0.300
Median county household income ($1000s) 0.969** 0.014 0.971* 0.054 0.953*** 0.000
More than 800 internet connections per 1000 households in
county by end of 2014
1.215 0.212 1.639** 0.022 1.223 0.399
Percent of county residents identifying as white, 2010 0.990 0.402 0.972* 0.056 1.004 0.801
County population density 1.000 0.482 1.000 0.889 1.001 0.328
Fewer than 400 internet connections per 1000 county house-
holds by end of 2014
0.880 0.695 0.498 0.105 0.811 0.516
(1) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported income from energy production
(2) Binary outcome: 1= energy production made up more than 50% of net farm income
(3) Binary outcome: 1= farm reported $10,000 or more income from energy production
worth is just .361.
Finally, there seems to be a positive correlation between higher education (by the prin-
cipal operator or his/her spouse) and energy development.
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5.3 Predictors of oil and gas leases
Comparing the attributes of farms with oil and gas leases to those of farms with other
types of leases, one is immediately struck by how few independent variables are statisti-
cally significant predictors of both. For this section, we regressed each dependent variable
(a binary variable reflecting whether the given farm had leased (a) oil and gas rights or
(b) other rights) on 53 independent variables. Eighteen attributes were significantly corre-
lated with oil and gas leasing, eleven were correlated with other leases, and just six were
correlated with both.
To show the contrast between predictors of these different types of leases, we present
the results of the logistic regressions in four tables. In each, we highlight significant,
positive correlations in green and significant, negative correlations in purple. The first
table contains covariates that were significant with both dependent variables; the second
shows those that were significant predictors of oil and gas leases but not other leases;
and the third focuses on covariates that were not significant for oil and gas leases, but
were significant predictors of leasing other property rights. The fourth table lists the 30
independent variables that were not significant predictors of either.
Once again, the size of a farm is correlated with the likelihood of participating in
a lease. Larger operations may suffer less disruption from development of a few acres,
parties seeking to lease land or rights may prefer seek out larger blocs of land, or each
additional acre may simply increase the odds that some land owned will overlap with
resources worth leasing. The proportion of land owned to operated is also significant for
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Table 5.9: Significant predictors of oil/gas and other leases
Oil and gas leases (a) Other leases (b)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
1.002*** 0.003 Acres owned, in 100s 1.001*** 0.003
1.573*** 0.000 Non-farm household assets total ≥ $1 million 1.438** 0.023
1.320** 0.024 Principal operator or spouse graduated 4-year college 1.695*** 0.000
1.484*** 0.001 State avg retail electricity rate, cents 1.379*** 0.000
0.694*** 0.008 State avg retail natural gas rate, cents 0.789*** 0.001
1.028*** 0.000 State natural gas production, MMcf produced per square mile 1.009*** 0.000
(a) Binary outcome: farm reported oil and gas rights leased for some acres owned
(b) Binary outcome: farm reported other rights leased for some acres owned
oil and gas leasing, and nearly so for other leases (see Table 5.10).
Operators with substantial non-farm assets are also more likely to lease rights for some
acres owned. Wealthier households may be in a better position to take advantage of leas-
ing opportunities. Alternately, this result may simply reflect households using farm lease
income to accrue non-farm assets.
There is a strong correlation between college graduation and leasing, noteworthy since
education is not a significant predictor of energy production income (see Table 5.2).
It is not surprising that state natural gas production is correlated with the likelihood of a
farm leasing oil or gas rights. However, it is also correlated with non-oil or gas leases. This
is interesting, especially since there is also a significant (negative) association between
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such leases and average natural gas prices (strongly correlated with regional production)
and a near-significant relationship with county-level gas production (see Table 5.10). One
possible explanation is “other leases” would include rights leased for activities related to
regional oil and gas development (e.g., leasing right-of-way for a pipeline or leasing land
for a construction camp). However, if that were the case, we would also expect to see a
correlation between non-oil/gas leasing and several other independent variables pertaining
to state and county oil production, as well as to changes in county natural gas production. If
those correlations exist, they are not obvious in our data. It is also possible that this result,
as well as those for the two other state-level covariates in this table, reflect unobserved
state-level differences in property rights, regulation, or the prevalence of split estates.
For nearly every covariate in our models, the direction of association was the same
for oil and gas leases and other leases. Two notable exceptions are shown in Table 5.10.
There is a near-significant correlation between quality of wind resources and non-oil and
gas leases, as one would expect for a treatment group that includes wind development
leasers. However, farms in such counties are also significantly less likely to lease oil
or gas rights, which is difficult to explain. As with energy production more generally,
farms in more liberal counties (expressed as percent vote for Hillary Clinton in 2016) are
less likely to report oil or gas leasing. However, our results hint at a positive correlation
between Democratic lean in a farm’s county and participation in other types of leases,
though that association falls well short of significance.
Oil and gas leases, but not other leases, had a negative association with median county
household income. This result is consistent with a hypothesis that wealthier areas are less
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Table 5.10: Predictors significant only for oil/gas leases
Oil and gas leases (a) Other leases (b)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
0.688** 0.034 County contains ”good” or better wind resources 1.267* 0.068
1.000** 0.014 County oil production (1000s barrels), 2011 1.000 0.901
0.150** 0.021 County vote for Clinton in 2016 presidential election (%) 2.008 0.300
0.972** 0.014 Median county household income ($1000s) 0.986 0.226
1.000*** 0.003 Natural gas produced in county, 2011 (million cubic feet) 1.000* 0.093
1.357** 0.021 Off-farm household income at least $100,000 in 2013 1.299 0.422
0.993*** 0.000 Percent of acres operated rented from another landowner 0.994* 0.094
0.777** 0.011 Principal operator has a dwelling on farm operation 1.014 0.940
0.701*** 0.004 Ratio of net farm to total household income: HIGH 0.979 0.908
0.557** 0.016 Ratio of net farm to total household income: NEGATIVE 0.753 0.152
0.200*** 0.000 Retirement: NO RESPONSE 0.366 0.179
0.461** 0.015 Risk tolerance: NO RESPONSE 0.665 0.477
(a) Binary outcome: farm reported oil and gas rights leased for some acres owned
(b) Binary outcome: farm reported other rights leased for some acres owned
willing to accept or more able to block development on farmland with potential negative
externalities.
The association noted in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 between energy income and high off-
farm income is present, here, for oil and gas leases. Since rent and payments from an oil
and gas lease would be considered on-farm income, this suggests that households with
high off-farm income may be more willing or able to use part of their agricultural land
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Table 5.11: Predictors significant only for non-oil/gas leases
Oil and gas leases (a) Other leases (b)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
1.265 0.138 Conservation payments to farm in 2014 1.807*** 0.002
1.207 0.202 Farm debt: more than $250,000 1.883** 0.019
1.019 0.873 Farm specialty: livestock or animal products 0.639*** 0.002
1.006 0.510 Relative county solar resource (percentile of U.S. counties) 1.019*** 0.000
0.967* 0.052 State solar net generation, MWh per square mile 0.978*** 0.000
(a) Binary outcome: farm reported oil and gas rights leased for some acres owned
(b) Binary outcome: farm reported other rights leased for some acres owned
for energy development. Supporting this view, there is also a negative correlation between
oil and gas leasing and high household dependence on farm income. Operators with less
non-farm income seem just as likely to sign other types of leases, which would include
leases of property rights that would not disrupt farming (e.g., hunting or water access), as
those relying on off-farm income.
Farm operators that live on their farmland are significantly less likely to have an oil and
gas lease. Just as studies of non-operating landlords by Hitaj et al. (2018) and Bigelow
et al. (2016) demonstrated that more distant landowners were more likely to lease oil and
gas rights, owner-operators that live off-site may be less vulnerable to negative quality of
life impacts from oil and gas development.
Turning to predictors that were significant only for non-oil and gas leases, we see a
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somewhat unusual relationship with area solar production. Farms are more likely to report
non-oil or gas leases in counties with relatively good solar resources, which could reflect
solar development or recreation-related leases in sunnier areas. There is a near-significant
negative association between state solar generation and oil and gas leasing, which seems
similar to an effect noted above for energy production income. However, farms in states
with more solar generation are also less likely to report other types of leases, which is
difficult to explain.
Farms that received payments from federal conservation programs in 2014 were more
likely to have leased non-oil or gas rights. At first glance, this is surprising. In rental
payment programs like the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Conservation Re-
serve Enhancement Program (CREP), the USDA pays farmers to remove sensitive land
from production and undertake conservation work. CRP and CREP participants accept
limits on their rights to use or develop covered land. Cost-sharing conservation programs
like the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) and Conservation Stewardship
Program (CSP) provide technical and financial assistance to farmers adopting more sus-
tainable agricultural practices, aiming to increase farmland productivity while decreasing
negative environmental impacts. Both EQIP and CSP require participants to invest their
own funds, and program interventions are intended to increase the per-acre productivity
of participants. It would be surprising for program participants to forego these benefits by
leasing out improved farmland for a non-agricultural use. One possible explanation is that
land covered by CRP and CREP may be more attractive for hunting and other recreational
uses; the USDA explicitly allows participants to lease such rights on covered land. Alter-
nately, productivity-enhancing programs like EQIP and CSP may encourage operators to
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devote more time and other resources to their most best land, freeing up more marginal
farmland for other uses.
High debt (in absolute terms) was a significant predictor of energy income in 5 of 6
model specifications laid out in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Here, however, we only observed a
correlation with non-oil and gas leases.
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Table 5.12: Significant predictors of neither oil/gas nor other leases
Oil and gas leases (a) Other leases (b)
odds ratio p-score odds ratio p-score
1.001 0.821 Age of primary operator 1.003 0.706
1.000 0.934 Change in county natural gas production (million cubic feet),
2000 to 2011
1.001 0.834
1.000 0.118 Change in county oil production (1000s barrels), 2000 to 2011 1.000 0.743
1.000 0.780 County population density 0.999 0.213
0.926 0.741 Debt to asset ratio 0.489 0.415
0.803 0.175 Farm debt: less than $1000 0.887 0.764
0.836 0.502 Farm specialty: fruit or vegetables 0.889 0.787
1.079 0.653 Farm specialty: grains or oilseeds 0.785 0.382
0.867 0.693 Farmer experience: less than 5 years 0.498 0.200
1.093 0.548 Farmer experience: more than 10 years 1.067 0.679
1.086 0.828 Farmer experience: NO RESPONSE 0.659 0.341
0.896 0.673 Female farmer 0.937 0.756
1.045 0.891 Fewer than 400 internet connections per 1000 households 1.098 0.786
0.772* 0.100 Fixed farm costs greater than $50,000 (highest quartile) 0.802 0.468
1.047 0.862 Fixed farm costs less than $5,000 (lowest quartile) 0.576 0.114
1.136 0.448 More than 800 internet connections per 1000 households 1.215 0.151
0.704* 0.070 Non-farm debt: high 0.808 0.377
0.910 0.539 Non-farm debt: none 0.893 0.419
1.079 0.644 Non-farm household assets total less than $50,000 1.107 0.644
1.183 0.358 Off-farm household income NEGATIVE in 2013 0.922 0.765
1.000 0.980 Percent of county residents identifying as white, 2010 1.013* 0.063
1.015 0.729 Principal operator annual hours worked on farm (1000s) 1.092 0.238
0.841 0.292 Production or marketing contract in place 1.113 0.484
0.396 0.110 Ratio of net farm to total household income: NO RESPONSE 0.894 0.852
1.168 0.338 Retirement: plans to retire within 3 years 1.266 0.248
1.070 0.609 Risk tolerance: HIGH 1.091 0.629
1.000 0.400 State crude oil production, barrels produced per square mile 1.000 0.141
1.001 0.621 State wind net generation, MWh per square mile 1.001 0.166
1.203 0.350 Value of farm production: highest quartile 0.928 0.829
0.797 0.205 Value of farm production: lowest quartile 1.087 0.703
(a) Binary outcome: farm reported oil and gas rights leased for some acres owned
(b) Binary outcome: farm reported other rights leased for some acres owned
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS: IMPACTS OF ENERGY LEASE INCOME ON PARTICIPATING
FARMS
Under the assumptions described in Chapter 4, propensity score matching permits
causal inference of the impacts of income from energy production on participating farms’
financial characteristics. Energy production income clearly had a positive effect on some
operations: treated farms were more likely to make capital investments, more likely to
report net farm income over $100,000, and less likely to report negative net farm income.
Overall, however, energy production income had no significant effect on the amount of per-
operation capital investment, total net farm income, or the presence of credit constraints.
The results below reflect the average treatment effect on the treated.
Farms with energy production income were consistently more likely to report some
capital spending, but we observed little difference in the amount invested by treated farms
compared to their near-peers in the control group. The former result suggests that en-
ergy production income is important for some operations that could not otherwise justify
or afford capital investment; the latter result, however, leads us to believe that this effect
is trivial when looking at per-operation capital investment by farms more broadly. The
coefficient of capital spending is positive in both the base specification (Table 6.1) and
when limiting the treatment group to energy income over $10,000 (Table 6.3). Neverthe-
less, both fall well short of statistical significance. The correlation was significant in only
one specification, in which the treatment group was confined to farms receiving a large
proportion of their net farm income from energy production (Table 6.2).
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Table 6.1: Financial impacts: received any energy production income
Outcome Coefficient Stand. Error P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.132 0.016 0.000 29,696
Amount spent on capital $15,428 $14,517 0.288 18,800
Total net farm income $12,475 $38,826 0.748 29,696
Net farm income: over $100,000 0.119 0.017 0.000 29,696
Net farm income: negative -0.065 0.016 0.000 29,696
Farm is credit constrained -0.002 0.008 0.770 25,903
Treatment group: farms reporting income from energy production
Table 6.2: Financial impacts: 25% of net income from energy production
Outcome Coefficient Stand. Error P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.131 0.023 0.000 29,726
Amount spent on capital $31,376 $14,409 0.029 18,802
Net farm income results presented separately
Farm is credit constrained -0.007 0.010 0.492 25,878
Treatment group: farms receiving at least 25% of net farm income from energy production
Table 6.3: Financial impacts: received ≥ $10,000 energy production income
Outcome Coefficient Stand. Error P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.166 0.024 0.000 29,697
Amount spent on capital $38,832 $30,067 0.197 18,800
Net farm income $98,150 $82,839 0.236 29,697
Net farm income: over $100,000 0.247 0.025 0.000 29,697
Net farm income: negative -0.141 0.024 0.000 29,697
Farm is credit constrained -0.011 0.011 0.317 25,904
85
Table 6.4: Impacts on intermediate and commercial farms receiving energy
production income
Outcome Coefficient Stand. Error P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.042 0.017 0.017 17,795
Amount spent on capital $1,050 $13,082 0.936 13,126
Net farm income -$80,974 $56,142 0.149 17,795
Net farm income: over $100,000 0.025 0.024 0.293 17,795
Net farm income: negative -0.027 0.021 0.201 17,795
Farm is credit constrained 0.007 0.010 0.462 15,723
Energy production income also did not demonstrably increase per-operation net farm
income1. Treated farms were, however, more likely to be in the high-income group and
less likely to report negative net farm income.
There is no evidence that energy production income relieved credit constraints. In all of
our specifications, treated farms were no more or less likely to report difficulty borrowing.
After removing residence-type farms from the sample (see Table 6.4), energy produc-
tion income had a positive impact on the likelihood of farms investing in capital assets. The
apparent size of the effect and the statistical significance were, however, weaker than in the
full sample. We observed no other significant effects from energy income for intermediate
and commercial farms. In this context, it is important to remember that energy produc-
1The “25% net farm income” case is an exception, almost by definition. For farms with low or negative
profits from agriculture, any amount of energy production will make up a large percent of net income.
Coef. S.E. P Common sup.
Net farm income -$180,552 $42,669 0.000 29,726
Net farm income: over $100,000 -0.024 0.020 0.238 29,726
Net farm income: negative 0.149 0.024 0.000 29,726
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Table 6.5: Impacts of oil and gas leases vs. other leases
Oil or gas leases
Outcome Coefficient Standard Er-
ror
P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.129 0.019 0.000 18,925
Amount spent on capital $5,923 $16,719 0.723 13,673
Net farm income -$14,931 $42,682 0.726 18,925
Net farm income: over $100,000 0.032 0.023 0.155 18,925
Net farm income: negative -0.007 0.021 0.721 18,925
Farm is credit constrained -0.006 0.010 0.550 16,672
All other leases
Outcome Coefficient Standard Er-
ror
P-value Common support
Likelihood of investing in capital assets 0.120 0.028 0.000 18,945
Amount spent on capital expenses $20,801 $19,314 0.281 13,702
Net farm income $34,952 $76,354 0.647 18,945
Net farm income: over $100,000 0.077 0.037 0.040 18,945
Net farm income: negative -0.046 0.033 0.156 18,945
Farm is credit constrained -0.013 0.015 0.070 16,689
tion income is a small part of gross income for most treated farms: among intermediate-
and commercial-type farms reporting energy income, the median annual payment was just
$7,000. The energy payments may simply be too small for farm operators, particularly
those with intermediate- and commercial-type farms, to factor into investment decisions.
Comparing farms with oil or gas leases to those leasing other rights (see Table 6.5), we
found again that both types of leases led to a higher likelihood of capital investment. For
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farms with an oil and gas lease, we found little evidence of other impacts on farm finances.
For other leases, however, our findings suggest an increased likelihood of the leasing farm
having high net farm income.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS
7.1 Impact of energy leasing on farms
Our results suggest that, in the broadest terms, the true impacts of energy development on
farmland are more complex than either of the popular narratives laid out in the introduc-
tion. There is certainly little evidence of farmers with energy leases on average winding
down their operations or planning for a long-term reduction in output. However, it also
seems that the benefits of energy leasing are small for most host farms. Energy production
income encourages reinvestment by some farms, but has a negligible effect on the average
amount of capital investment by treated farms. Farms with energy leases are less likely to
report negative net farm income and more likely to report farm income over $100,000 than
peers with comparable characteristics but, at the same time, energy production income has
little apparent impact on mean net farm incomes. As a whole, energy development does
not seem to be either a threat or a panacea for participating farms, let alone the broader
agricultural economy.
7.2 Predictors of energy lease participation
Energy production leases are more common among larger operations and wealthier farm
households. Acres owned, off-farm income, and non-farm assets were consistently signif-
icant predictors of energy income.
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Table 7.1: Summary of significant correlation between de-
pendent and selected independent variables
The operator’s per-
sonal characteristics were
less significant than an-
ticipated. We found lit-
tle evidence of a sig-
nificant correlation be-
tween the likelihood of
a farm having energy in-
come and the farm op-
erator’s age, risk toler-
ance, time spent farm-
ing, or retirement plans.
Education was a signif-
icant predictor, but only
for larger farms.
Location is impor-
tant in several ways. Unsurprisingly, the energy resources in a farm’s area affect the likeli-
hood of energy leasing. Greater regional hydrocarbon resources and production intensity
strongly predict energy leasing. Solar resource quality is also associated with higher leas-
ing likelihood, though more weakly. However, the relationship is ambiguous for wind
resources and farms in states with more solar net generation (adjusted for state area) are
actually less likely to report an energy lease, possibly due to more demanding regulation
of oil and gas development in states that have emphasized solar expansion.
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Less obviously, differences in county-level socioeconomic characteristics are also tied
to the likelihood of energy development. We observed a strong relationship between a
county’s vote in the 2016 presidential election and energy leases on its farmland. Farmers
in more Democratic-leaning counties were significantly less likely to report energy pro-
duction income than would otherwise be expected. There is strong evidence of a similar
association affecting farms in counties with higher median household income, possibly ev-
idence that wealthier communities are less willing to accept (or more effectively oppose)
nearby energy development.
7.3 Implications for farmers, planners, and developers
Are energy leases good for farmers? Our results suggest a resounding “maybe.” Farms
with energy leases are more likely to turn a profit and to make capital investments. How-
ever, energy leases tend to be associated with larger and wealthier owner-operators rather
than with operations that might otherwise struggle to break even or invest in future pro-
ductivity. Interventions that give such operations more access to energy development op-
portunities could be beneficial. In a similar vein, extension services and farm agencies
could expand training for farmers interested in energy leasing and help to connect energy
developers to appropriate partners.
Nevertheless, stakeholders should not anticipate energy development to dramatically
change the circumstances of most host farms, let alone impact the local agricultural econ-
omy. Energy production income is typically a small contribution to household income
with little impact on a farm’s overall financial outlook. In particular, it does not seem to
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be a solution for farms facing limited or no access to credit. If the overall benefits to U.S.
farmers are limited, though, so are the overall costs. There is little evidence that energy
development has adversely affected host farms. There is no apparent negative impact on
net income or on capital investments.
7.4 Next steps
The TOTAL survey of non-operating agricultural landlords offers an opportunity to per-
form similar analysis, identifying landowner attributes associated with higher likelihood
of leasing land for energy development. Those findings, in turn, could clarify the likely
consequences of energy development on the availability and price of rented farmland.
In the longer term, new surveys could fill in many of the gaps left at the conclusion of
this study. TOTAL data provides an excellent snapshot of participating farms in 2014, but
is an imperfect source for studying effects over time. This study also cannot differentiate
between different types of energy production, and does not consider income from energy-
related facilities like pipelines, transmission corridors, and construction staging grounds.
Additional data may be necessary to demonstrate causal relationships for the independent
variables used in the predictive logistic model and to address the risk of omitted variable
bias in the PSM model.
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APPENDIX A
OVERLAP BETWEEN TREATMENT GROUPS
Table A.1: Overlap Between Treatment Groups
A only:
701
B only:
655
C only:
283
A ∩ B
707
A ∩ C:
210
B ∩ C:
106
A ∩ B ∩ C:
68
We based the treatment groups in this study on questions 555, 7020, and 7026 from the
TOTAL questionnaire. These questions, respectively, asked respondents to report income
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from “royalties or leases associated with energy production (e.g. natural gas, oil, and wind
turbines)”; acres of owned land with the oil and gas rights leased out; and acres of owned
land with other rights leased out. There is substantial overlap between these treatment
groups, as shown in Figure A.1. Of the 29,733 observations in the TOTAL data set, 2,526
are in one or more treatment groups.
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